SEVENTH CONGRESS FOR DEMOCRACY
held at Church House, Westminster
on Friday 1 March 2002

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Chairman: Austin Mitchell MP

Gibraltar and the European Union

Austin Mitchell MP, Co-Chairman, welcomed those present to the Seventh Congress for Democracy and introduced the first speaker, Ms Marie Lou Guerrero, Chairman of the Gibraltar Federation of Small Businesses.

Marie Lou Guerrero, Chairman, Gibraltar Federation of Small Businesses
She described in some detail the problems faced by those living in Gibraltar. The frontier with Spain had been closed for nearly twenty years, and the situation had deteriorated in 1987 when the people of Gibraltar had rejected an agreement between Britain and Spain giving Spain dual control of the airport. Spain exercised a stranglehold over normal activities in Gibraltar in many ways:

• International calls routed through Spain were blocked and mobile telephones did not work in Spain.
• Travel was difficult: aircraft and liners were not permitted to travel direct between Gibraltar and Spain; they had to go to Morocco or Tangier en route, and Gibraltar had been excluded from all EU directives and regulations relating to airports and air traffic.
• All cars were searched at the border, causing delays of at least an hour.
• Spain vetoed Gibraltar’s participation in international events (conferences, sports competitions etc).
• Spain refused to recognise any Gibraltarian institutions, authorities or the judiciary; even passports and driving licences were frequently not recognised.

Gibraltar had no representation in the European Parliament despite a ruling of the Court of Human Rights that her people should be represented, but Spain ensured that Gibraltar complied with all EU regulations, which was expensive, time-consuming and occasionally irrelevant. Moreover, Gibraltar received no help from Britain in asserting her democratic rights or gaining any benefit from membership of the EU.

Now Gibraltar was being asked to surrender half her sovereignty in exchange for good relations with her neighbour and respect for her rights in the EU, to both of which she was already entitled. The people of Gibraltar were British and because they were not prepared to share their British sovereignty they were to be denied their democratic, political and human rights.

Ms Guerrero dismissed the assurances that Spain had changed its attitude to Gibraltar since becoming a democracy. The people of Gibraltar had been told by the Foreign Office that by June the British and Spanish Governments would have signed a declaration of principles which would include some kind of shared sovereignty concessions with Spain, and that the Gibraltarians could either accept or reject it, but the status quo would not be an option. There would be a vote, but once the agreement had been signed it could not be withdrawn. Ms Guerrero felt this was wrong; the agreement should not survive rejection in a referendum.

She believed there was support in Britain for the determination of the people of Gibraltar to remain British and appealed to those present to do what they could to prevent the British Government entering into any agreement with the Spanish Government.

Following Ms Guerrero’s speech Austin Mitchell proposed the motion:

that Gibraltar should remain British and the decision of its people should be binding.

This was passed unanimously by Congress.

(Full text of this speech here)

Session 2:

Sir Michael Spicer MP, Co-Chairman
He said that the Congress’s Agenda Committee had decided to consult all those on the mailing list as to whether Congress should consider a motion that the Congress for Democracy should apply to the Electoral Commissioner to be the designated organisation for the pro-pound side in a referendum campaign.

Representatives of Business for Sterling and New Europe had opposed the motion, two organisations were against the motion being put but in favour of an agreement between the Congress and the "No" Campaign, and 14 organisations had supported the motion. He had been asked to negotiate with Business for Sterling and the "No" Campaign with the aim of trying to form a joint campaign. It had not been possible to reach an agreement on this, and the Congress did not at present have the resources to set up a campaign of its own.

The Congress provided a meeting point for those who were anxious about developments in Europe. Past meetings of the Congress had resolved to unite against the euro and had also passed the Declaration for Democracy, which included the following resolutions.

1. The electorate must agree by referendum any further transfer of power to the EU.

2. The Common Law of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the ancient legal system of Scotland, trial by jury and habeas corpus are inviolate, and must not be weakened by alien European law and any attempt to do so must be resisted.

3. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, or any "European Constitution", will transfer too much power from national parliaments to unaccountable European judges. A European Constitution is unthinkable and the Charter of Fundamental Rights is unacceptable, even in declaratory form.

4. National parliaments must be the custodians of their peoples' constitutions, taxation, defence, foreign affairs, jurisprudence, police and electoral policy.

5. This will involve the retrieval of powers already granted to the European Union and the rejection of the legal process by which powers are expanded by the European federal institutions and then retained forever.

The issue before Congress was whether it should continue to meet, and to make known its anxieties about the threat to Britain’s legal system from the next IGC and the potential destruction of her identity as a nation through the Convention on the Future of Europe.

He proposed to divide discussion into two parts, the first dealing with the euro and any impending campaigning and the second considering the future role of the Congress. Initially he would call six speakers who represented some of the significant organisations making up the Congress:

• Austin Mitchell MP, Congress Co-Chairman, Congress for Democracy
  and Chair of the Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign;
• Russell Walters, Director of the Democracy Movement
• Christopher Gill, Chairman of the Freedom Association
• Lord Stoddart, Chairman of the Campaign for an Independent Britain
• Lord Pearson, Co-Founder of Global Britain

Austin Mitchell MP, Chair, Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign
Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign did not think it appropriate for the Congress to make an application to be the designated organisation for the No to the euro campaign; there should be a broadly representative organisation which would present a united front. Side issues such as corpus juris and leaving the EU should be excluded from the single-issue campaign: Yes or No to the euro. Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign had been attracted by the way in which the Danes had run their successful No campaign, as a broad alliance of groups opposed to the euro. Each organisation had put its case to its own members and supporters but had also tried to appeal to the wider community.

He and Michael Spicer had held discussions with Business for Sterling, who were committed to their "Europe Yes, Euro No" position, despite its not being broadly representative of the groups opposed to the euro. LESC would like discussion to continue to establish the umbrella because it wanted a broader common ground than Business for Sterling was prepared to take.

The body most broadly representative of the groups opposed to the euro would be chosen by the Electoral Commission, and a prolonged public argument about which body that should be would be disastrous. Quiet consultations should continue but, he warned, argument about whether to stay in or get out of Europe would play into the hands of the other side. It was essential for the campaign to tell the electorate with a single voice that the euro would be bad for Britain, that it would lock Britain into an irreversible process of ever-closer union and that it would remove from the control of the British government the ability to manage the British economy for the benefit of the people. Finally, he warned, it would be an uphill struggle because huge forces of propaganda and financial resources would be deployed in favour of the euro. But he still thought that, if united, those determined to keep the pound could win.

Russell Walters, Director, Democracy Movement
The Democracy Movement felt that there were two basic realities to be borne in mind when considering any approach to the campaign.

Firstly, the referendum would only be about the single currency; there would be no option to vote on leaving the EU. The vote would be between the pound and full economic and monetary union. It was the view of the Democracy Movement that all groups involved in the campaign had to be disciplined for the six months of the campaign and work together to prevent a yes vote. Any attempt to link the two issues, keeping the pound and getting out of the EU, would alienate the overwhelming majority of voters who, although pro-pound at this stage, also wanted Britain to stay in the EU. He quoted opinion polls which showed that, although support for the pound stood at 60% against 27% for the euro, only 30% and 10% were absolutely committed to either side. Winning the referendum by 5% or 10% would only bring about another referendum; only a margin of 20% or 25% would end the matter. It was therefore essential to avoid alienating a single vote by tying the cause to others which were less popular during the campaign. Until the referendum was announced campaigners could continue to alert the British people to other issues, but once the referendum campaign started all should be totally committed to the one achievable objective: saving the pound. The fight would not be led by Congress but must be supported by all associated with it.

The second reality was the Convention, which had met for the first time. It was charged with drawing up the 2004 Treaty, intended to complete the work of creating a superstate. The Government’s position, explained by Jack Straw in a recent speech, was that Britain should surrender control over home affairs. The Democracy Movement urged that everything possible be done to oppose the Treaty; a Government defeat in a euro referendum would help. However, the referendum might not be held before 2004 and it was therefore important now to alert the public to the dangers and to create so much concern that Mr Blair was forced to concede a referendum on the Treaty. He saw this as a role for the Congress for Democracy. United, the Congress could monitor and expose the deliberations of the Convention. The Government would want to ingratiate itself with the centralising current within the EU whilst playing down the significance of the proceedings to the British people. He urged that Congress should work to make that impossible.

Christopher Gill, Chairman, Freedom Association
The Freedom Association was not a single-issue pressure group and therefore had a legitimate interest wherever freedom was threatened. The Association had concluded that political freedom was quite incompatible with European integration and the best thing that the United Kingdom could do would be to leave the European Union. They therefore had some reservations about the slogan being promoted by the "No" Campaign: "Europe Yes, euro No", which was not broadly representative. He was sure that the Freedom Association would be prepared to sing very small about its wish to leave the EU in the context of a debate about the single currency and the referendum, but he would have preferred others to sing small on the question of Europe Yes, so that opposition to the single currency could be more easily united.

He accepted that all groups must come together for the duration of the referendum campaign but, whilst there was no certainty that there would be a referendum on the single currency, there would definitely be another Inter-Governmental Conference in 2004, which would undoubtedly compromise freedoms and democracy in Britain. He saw the concentration of the argument on the issue of the single currency as a tactic of the integrationists to distract attention from the drive towards European integration.

He said that, although it was often suggested that the many small eurosceptic organisations should all come together and form one bigger group, he felt that to do so would be a mistake because smaller groups could retain an element of surprise. A large organisation might find it easier to organise and raise funds, but a large number of small groups could confuse the enemy, who would never know when and where to expect opposition. Moreover, in his view, the formation of a single large organisation would provide a better target for infiltration and neutralisation by the opposition.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon, Chairman, Campaign for an Independent Britain
He said that the Campaign for an Independent Britain had not supported a resolution being put to the Congress that they should apply to be the lead organisation in the referendum but they had asked that there should be further discussions with the "No" Campaign to try to reach agreement on one umbrella organisation which all those involved could join. He thought it unfortunate that that approach had been rejected. It was his view that the whole of the eurorealist movement must be involved in any referendum campaign to save the pound; the campaign should not be monopolised by an elite group of businessmen and former senior politicians.

As far as he knew no organisation was planning to use the referendum on the currency as a platform for getting Britain out of Europe; they were all prepared to concentrate on the issue of saving the pound. However, he agreed with other speakers that it would prove impossible during the campaign to save the pound to prevent those issues being raised. He predicted a Europe-wide referendum in 2004 on a written constitution and a European government, coinciding with the European parliamentary elections. It was possible that the Government would decide to hold a referendum on the euro at the same time, in which case a campaign fighting solely on the economic tests would be irrelevant. There was a need for unity in the campaign to keep the pound, but not on terms dictated by one organisation. He urged that discussions should continue to take place with the "No" Campaign.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch, Co-Founder of Global Britain
He said that, although he had previously thought that a referendum would never take place, he now felt it was more of a possibility. He was a come-outer and he and his fellow come-outers would vote against the euro in any circumstances. The objective of the official campaign would have to be to reach those who thought they liked the European Union but could be persuaded to vote to keep the pound. The "No" Campaign had said that the Government’s strategy was to make the "No" Campaign look like a front for come-outery, which would frighten people so much that the pro-euro campaign could win. It had to be remembered that campaigners for the pound would be up against the government machine and millions of pounds from the European Union. The Government would try to confine the campaign to the economic aspects of the euro and avoid the constitutional arguments and would be supported in that by the BBC and, he thought, the Conservative Party. It was his belief that the constitutional issue would explode during the campaign.

On that basis he believed that the elements of Congress which were not committed publicly to come-outery should get into the main campaign, which would probably be best organised by Business for Sterling. He urged his fellow come-outers to do what they could to support them in getting the official money to fight the campaign. The come-outers faced a dilemma: whether to remain independent and fight the campaign as satellites or to form themselves into a body to help the "No" Campaign, in which case they should stick to the issue of the single currency.

He thought that the Congress should continue and should begin to discuss the issues surrounding the Convention and the terrifying prospect of the constitution of the European Union; this could be done without compromising the "No" Campaign.

(Full text of these speeches here)

Mr Ron Dorman, Campaign Against euro Federalism
The Campaign Against Euro Federalism shared the view of the Freedom Association that Britain should withdraw from the EU, and believed that they should continue to campaign on that basis. He believed that there should be one umbrella organisation and that efforts should be made to bring that about, but not at the price of campaigning only on the currency. Once the referendum date had been announced the situation would be different and CAEF might then consider campaigning solely on the euro.

He read out a statement from the Campaign Against euro Federalism, urging concerted action to make a serious impact on the debate about the single currency and warning of the activities already being pursued by those in favour of joining the euro (the Government, CBI and TUC) and the avalanche of propaganda which would be released during the official referendum campaign period. CAEF stressed that the campaign should not pivot on the Conservative party position, which would be counter-productive, alienating Labour voters and those who did not normally vote. The statement urged that the organisations in the Congress should launch a campaign immediately, setting up an infrastructure based initially on ad hoc committees in cities and major conurbations, thereby enabling people to take part as individuals. Whilst not seeking to prevent the organisations from addressing their own interest groups, it was stressed that they should all come together to fight this single-issue campaign and all organisations wishing to be represented in the campaign should be represented on the national committee by delegates. Failure to establish such a campaign could, in CAEF’s view, lose the referendum.

John Mills, Secretary, Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign
He made three points:

1. Negotiations with the "No" Campaign must continue because Congress represented a much wider range of interests. When the referendum took place it would be essential to persuade people to go out and vote. Without involving the organisations represented in the Congress for Democracy the "No" Campaign would not reach them all.

2. The campaign needed to be diverse; it was unrealistic to expect all campaigners to fit into one organisation because different arguments appealed to different groups. Those organisations in the Congress for Democracy had been fighting Euro-federalism for years, which he felt was not the case with the membership of the "No" Campaign.

3. The referendum campaign would need a substantial amount of organisation. The "No" Campaign had money, organisation and the capacity to produce good publications, but it lacked people used to campaigning on the ground. He hoped that Congress would authorise its leaders to negotiate with the "No" Campaign to permit involvement by its constituent organisations.

Sir Michael asked John Mills whether, as had been indicated by the "No" Campaign, Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign had agreed informally to support them as the official umbrella movement. John Mills replied that LESC would be prepared to support the "No" Campaign as the official umbrella organisation on the condition that the Congress for Democracy organisations were also involved. LESC did not think it would be right for the Congress for Democracy to be the umbrella organisation, excluding the "No" Campaign.

Sir Michael asked Brian Prime, International Ambassador of the Federation for Small Businesses, whether such a caveat applied to his organisation’s view.

Brian Prime said he had to discuss the issue with his National Council the following week. The Federation was a member of both Business for Sterling and the Congress for Democracy. He felt Business for Sterling was the best body to deal with the economic issues, but there were other issues involved.

Sir Robin Williams, Campaign for an Independent Britain
He said that his views coincided with those of Lord Pearson. Although public opinion polls showed that most people wanted to keep the pound there was a substantial number of people who believed that joining the euro was inevitable. He warned that the referendum could easily be lost, especially if the issue of the euro was allowed to become muddled up with the issue of coming out of the European Union. Those in favour of the euro would do everything they could to confuse the argument and take the conversation away from keeping the pound, which would be made easier for them if bodies which were known to favour leaving the EU were at the forefront of the referendum campaign. He felt the "No" Campaign should be the lead organisation. The Campaign for an Independent Britain would publish and distribute its own leaflets, and he thought its members would also be happy to distribute leaflets published by the "No" Campaign. Indeed, he thought all the organisations would work together. However, it was vital that when the referendum was called all those organisations campaigning to keep the pound should appear united; if agreement had not been reached with the "No" Campaign at that stage individual organisations should resist the temptation to express their views in public.

Baroness Park of Monmouth
She said that she had been very struck by the impression made on Congress by the speaker from Gibraltar because she had shown in detail the practical effects of what was happening there. She hoped that by the time the referendum campaign began steps would have been taken to make the British public aware of what had been happening in other countries as a result of the introduction of the euro, and urged members of Congress to talk to people in those countries and make public their comments. She said the campaign ought to appeal much more to the young and to recruit to the cause a really good footballer, a few media people, people who were young and spoke the right language. She warned that many under 24 simply thought the euro was marvellous because it would eliminate the need to change money before going to Spain. They needed to understand it was more important than that. She asked whether the Internet was being used in the campaign.

Tommy Williams
He denied that young people were apathetic, but agreed that Congress should take the debate out to younger people. He agreed that the constitutional issues of the single currency should be at the forefront of the campaign to keep the pound because most of the proponents of the single currency were arguing not from first principles but from abstract platitudes. The constitutional consequences of joining the single currency should be made clear to people in a way in which the ordinary person in the street could understand: the exchange rate would no longer be within the remit of the Westminster Parliament, but would be decided by unelected members of the European Central Bank.

Doug Nicholls, Community and Youth Workers’ Union, Trade Unions Against the Single Currency, and Congress for Democracy Agenda Committee
He said that Congress was the most broadly representative body campaigning against the single currency. This put it in a strong negotiating and bargaining position because, although the "No" Campaign and Business for Sterling were extremely effective media, public relations, lobbying and information organisations, they were clearly not broadly representative, nor did they have experience of campaigning on the ground. What was required to satisfy the legislation for the referendum and the Commissioner’s criteria was a broadly representative united campaign of all those prepared to say no to the euro; neither the "No" Campaign nor the Congress could achieve this alone. He thought that a new organisation might develop and the bodies involved would have to be prepared to pool their sovereignties to make it work. It was extremely important therefore that the Congress for Democracy should continue and should tackle the broader issues involved in the drive towards integration. He recommended that discussions between the Agenda Committee of Congress and other organisations should continue and, bearing in mind the criteria which would be applied when selecting the most representative umbrella group, urged Congress to present a united and optimistic front in the negotiations.

Daniel Hannan MEP
He reminded Congress that although it was not yet clear whether there would be a referendum in Britain, there were several forthcoming referendums on aspects of European integration around the continent. There was a guarantee of a referendum in Switzerland, a strong likelihood of a referendum in Ireland, a guarantee of a referendum on EU membership in Malta and strong possibilities of referendums in Estonia and elsewhere. As was always the case in referendums on European integration, there was the most grotesque imbalance in funding: the European Union, the Commission, the European Movement were pouring funds into the respective Yes campaigns in those countries. This had not proved an insurmountable obstacle in the past - in Denmark those opposed to the euro had won, despite an imbalance of about 14 to one. He urged members of Congress to show their concern for the freedom and independence of friendly peoples by supporting allied movements around the rest of Europe through a fund organised by the European Anti-Maastricht Alliance.

Rodney Atkinson
He urged members of Congress to write to the Electoral Commission expressing the view that the referendum should not require people to vote Yes or No because in referendums Governments demanded the answer Yes, allocating their opponents to the psychologically less popular No. The electorate should, in his view, be presented with two propositions and asked to select one.

He was very concerned by the degree of power vested in the Electoral Commission; it would decide the format of the question and it would also regulate the conduct of the organisations involved in the campaign.

He urged members of Congress to raise with the Electoral Commission and the press in general the argument that no question should ever be put to the British people, the true meaning of which was not expressed either in a preamble to the question or in the question itself, and he quoted an example of a MORI poll conducted by the South Moulton Declaration at the previous election, when they had been required to include a preamble to the question. They had been prepared to accept that condition, but had been dismayed to find that when recently questioned not a single polling organisation had accepted that such a principle should apply to a referendum question.

He suggested that Congress should take a stand on the structure of the referendum question and that, in order to challenge the legitimacy of the "No" Campaign, either the entire membership of each organisation represented at Congress should elect their representatives on Congress or those present as representatives should vote for a team of about a dozen to represent them. This would give the Congress for Democracy a legitimacy which neither Business for Sterling nor the "No" Campaign possessed.

Eric Deakins, Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign
Using the foot and mouth outbreak as an example, he commented on the failure of people to learn from previous mistakes. In 1975 there had been a referendum on whether Britain should stay in the Common Market. One of the many lessons learned in the 1975 campaign was that it was essential to ensure that the middle ground was held by the side that you represented. That middle ground should not be allowed to be undermined by false statements by the opposition, given some credence by statements made by some on your own side. He had been heartened by the attitude of Global Britain, CIB and the Democracy Movement in promising to exercise a self-denying ordinance during the period of any referendum campaign.

He regarded David Owen was an integrationist and he felt that the campaign, if run by people like him, would be weakened by the use of a minimum number of arguments. He urged that Congress maintain contacts with the "No" Campaign to ensure that the electorate were made aware of the disastrous and very unpopular consequences for the economy and the constitution which would follow adoption of the single currency. The inclusion of those arguments in the campaign would be good preparation for any referendum on constitutional developments coming from the 2004 Convention.

The extent to which it appeared that Labour backbenchers could influence Government had encouraged the Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign to exert pressure on Labour MPs who were soft on the issue, or even pro-euro, by calling public meetings before any campaign and referendum. He argued that when the issue came up in Parliament MPs would say their constituents were upset about the euro and urge the Government not to go ahead with the referendum. He felt that the current Labour backbenchers could be convinced by popular pressure.

Marc Glendening, Democracy Movement
He agreed with Lady Park that Congress needed to engage the young; it also needed to engage the 70% who voted for left-of-centre political parties and members of the ethnic minorities. The kiss of death for the crusade would be for those involved to come across as flag-waving little Englanders. He had been horrified to see a man dressed as John Bull at the CIB’s demonstration at the launch of the euro because it had been his image which had been in the newspapers. He argued that such publicity would play into the hands of their opponents, who were waging a black propaganda campaign designed to portray them to the British people as being xenophobic, racist and old-fashioned.

On Daniel Hannam’s point about engaging with comrades in other countries, he said that, although it was important to support those in other countries fighting the same fight for democracy, it was crucial to engage them (Danes, Germans, French and Italian eurosceptics) in the campaign within this country to demonstrate to the British people that the campaign was not just to defend democracy and civil liberties within Britain but to fight for all Europeans against the imposition of an undemocratic and rather sinister system of government based in Brussels.

Sir Michael Spicer commented that at each Congress there had been a speaker from abroad.

Lionel Bell, Anti-Maastricht Alliance but speaking in a personal capacity
Returning to the issue of Congress’s relationship with the "No" Campaign, he urged that efforts to promote integration between the two groups should continue as long as possible. If they campaigned on the basis that the issue was solely the Euro, and not membership of the European Union, they could enter a competition with the Yes campaign as to which could better say that membership of the EU was a great thing. Whereas the majority of campaigners could cope with that, it might upset a few get-outers to make the anti-euro campaign appear divided.

Mr Heathcoat-Amory said that the Convention had met for the first time the previous day. It had been set up by the Member States in the Laeken Declaration to look at everything to do with the European Union. It was charged with considering institutional changes considered necessary, partly as a result of enlargement, but also because there was a realisation that the existing institutions were not working efficiently or democratically. The Laeken Declaration specifically referred to the role of national parliaments and the Convention was also to look at the division of competencies with a view, controversially, to drawing up a constitution for Europe.

The Convention had 105 members; two from each of the national parliaments, 16 from the European Parliament, one member from each of the national governments, representatives from the Commission, from all twelve applicant countries and an observer from Turkey.

The Convention had been expected to hold its first working session that day but it had been cancelled because the rules for the Convention had been rejected by its members. The intention had been for a body called the Praesidium, composed of twelve members, to draw up the agenda in consultation with the President. However, the members of the Convention felt that they should have the right of initiative and had rejected the draft rules, which would be re-submitted later in the month.

Mr Heathcoat-Amory thought that it was widely felt that there was something wrong in Europe; in his view it was that the European Union lacked popular consent, demonstrated by the low turnout in European elections and the extraordinary results in referendums. It had been recognised that something had to be done to close the gap between those who ran Europe and the peoples of the Member States, but he feared that the Convention would simply become a bargaining process between the existing institutions. He quoted as an example the European Parliament which, in response to an acknowledged need for more democracy, had been given, and would continue to demand, additional powers. In his view that would not be the solution because many people did not vote in European elections. There was no European electorate, no public opinion, no demos. Although the President of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, was fond of drawing a parallel between the Convention and that which took place in Philadelphia in 1787 which drew up the constitution of the United States of America, the situation was totally different. Europe was a continent of nation states whose peoples felt they were represented primarily through their national parliaments, which they could change in elections. Once the power to govern was transferred from the elected representatives to an unelected body, democracy would be lost.

He saw the Convention on the Future of Europe as an opportunity to demand that powers be returned to the national governments where mistakes could be corrected. The EU Treaties contained the words "irreversibly" and "irrevocably" which were profoundly undemocratic. He did not think the problems were going to be solved by institutional adjustments; there was a need to stand back and look at the purpose of the Union. He used as an example the acquis communautaire, the whole body of rules and regulations which comprised the EU so far. It was not to be reviewed, and the twelve applicant countries were legislating to comply with it. He argued that the Convention would fail if there were no opportunity to question the relevance of the acquis communautaire and repeal parts of it.

He admitted that his eurosceptic views were very much in a minority on the Convention, but he had found some allies in the Democracy Group, chaired by Jens Peter Bonde MEP. They only numbered 12 or 15 but they were united in the belief that the empire of the Union must give way to a democratic and self-governing Europe of nation states, and he believed he represented a majority opinion in this country.

(Full text of speech here)

The Future Role of the Congress for Democracy

Ian Phillips
Describing himself as a voice from the grassroots, he asked that Congress question the legitimacy of everything that went on in Europe. He was very concerned about New Europe and David Owen and urged that negotiations with them be continued. He was deeply suspicious of New Europe, which seemed to him to support the proposed Constitution and to be involved with individuals who were engaged on the other side.

He felt it very dangerous for people not to stand up for what they believed in. If the come-outers were dissuaded from expressing their view the campaign could be thought to support permanent membership of the EU and the status quo simply because no one was saying anything different.

He suggested that the Congress, which represented many different organisations, should define the sort of Britain people wanted and the sort of relationship it should have with the other countries of Europe. He did not believe that would undermine the "No" Campaign and saw it as a positive message which people could support.

Mark Hill, Green Party
Referring to Mr Heathcoat-Amory’s speech, he expressed relief at the inaccuracy of 
M Giscard‘s analysis of the parallels with the signing of the American Constitution in the light of the behaviour of the USA since then.

He was a Green Party activist but the Green Party had decided to distance themselves from the Congress because some of the more nationalist statements made in previous forums had made them uneasy about full participation. The Green Party as a body would be participating fully within the "No" Campaign. They particularly wanted to see participation by Greens at a local level within the campaign. They also wanted the campaign to be representative on the ground, not only of the people wishing to campaign, but also of their political views. That meant, in his view, getting Labour Party, left-of-centre and other non-Tory figures on the No side in front of local and regional media. The campaign had to be on the issue which had most resonance for people and which would make them vote against the single currency on the day, that of employment and the single currency.

He supported the comments made earlier by Marc Glendening: the campaign in the past had not only had nationalist overtones, but it had also been silly. The campaign had to be vibrant and attractive, but that did not mean a descent to fancy dress.

Anthony Coughlan, the National Platform, Ireland, and European Anti-Maastricht Alliance
He expressed himself delighted to be at the Congress as an observer from the Republic of Ireland, where his organisation, the National Platform, was a research and information body providing information on EU matters. He had been pleased to see at Dublin Airport that morning that the newspaper headlines (Irish Independent and the Irish Examiner) had both related to price rises as a result of the introduction of the euro - a point relevant to the forthcoming debate in Britain. He pointed out that the ease with which the changeover to the euro had been effected had been a result of the need for people to accept the currency dispensed by the cash machines and not an indication of europhilia among the population.

He reminded Congress that voters in Ireland had voted No to the Nice Treaty by 54% to 46% the previous June but that had not prevented the Irish Government from encouraging other members of the EU to ratify the Treaty on the basis that it would persuade the Irish people to change their mind at a later date. The Government were expected to re-run the Nice referendum later in the year, probably in October or November. The main argument would be that as everyone else had now ratified, Ireland should not delay them all and that Ireland would be slung out of the EU if the people voted No. It was by no means certain that the very powerful forces pushing for a Yes to the Nice Treaty would succeed. One of the main advantages for the No side in Nice I had been the Irish Referendum Commission which had been given substantial amounts of public funds to put the arguments on the Yes and the No side, but last December the Government had rushed an Act through the Irish Parliament taking away from the Commission the function of setting out the Yes/No argument. Neither side would have public money behind their arguments for Nice II but the No campaign would be at more of a disadvantage, and he would be happy to meet anyone prepared to help. He reminded Congress that the Treaty of Nice was the necessary legal path to the division of the EU into two parts and the Convention; the Convention was to consummate that division, to bring into being a Union for the enlarged Europe and a Federation for the avant garde. Defeat for the Treaty of Nice would disrupt not only the Convention but EU development generally.

The strength of the Irish No to Nice campaign had been its diversity; there had been no umbrella group, and what had mattered on the ground had been house-to-house campaigning and personal contact. Such a campaign needed people, advertising and money. The campaign had also made a particular pitch to middle-ground opinion by urging people to vote No to hold the EU together because the Treaty of Nice proposed the division of the EU into two- an inner and an outer group. He had been taken by the slogan: Europe Yes - euro No. Although it might not appeal to all No campaigners, it would be more appropriate to the essential pitch for middle ground opinion, which was the only way to win a referendum in Britain. In Ireland for Nice II those opposed to the ratification of the Treaty had decided to use the slogan: Ireland Equal, designed to appeal to the middle ground, because Nice proposed to divide the EU into two groups and to move away from the concept of the EU as a partnership of legal equals.

Nigel Spearing, Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign
He congratulated Mr Heathcoat-Amory on being the first representative of the peoples of Europe to return from the Convention and address any meeting called specifically to discuss it. However, he was not the appointee of Parliament, but a representative of Her Majesty’s Opposition. As he understood it the Government had ignored the recommendation of the Select Committee set up to scrutinise European issues that appointments to the Convention should be by resolution of the House, and had made the two other appointments to the Convention itself. He did not think that the present Government appreciated the need for democratic representation in the Convention.

David Heathcoat-Amory MP
Mr Heathcoat-Amory said that the Government had appointed to the Convention a member of the government party (Mrs Gisela Stuart MP) without any vote at all which, in his view, was typical of the whole European debate. He could at least claim to have been elected by his party; the original proposal had been to appoint John Maples, but Iain Duncan Smith had insisted on holding a 24-hour election among Conservative MPs. He had won and become the Opposition representative. He conceded that the system had not been perfect, but it had been the best possible in the time available. At the Convention he had asked how the other parliamentary representatives had got their seats, and very few of them had been the outcome of any democracy at all. He said that the system had to change, otherwise there would be much talk about democracy but everything would be done secretly.

Turning to the question of the forum, he said that one of the Vice-Presidents had mentioned it; there was to be a mission to find out the views of people and groups, and he expected to learn more about it within a week. He emphasised the need for organisations represented at Congress to submit their ideas to the forum and keep him informed, otherwise the forum would be all talk and there would be no attempt to encourage ideas flowing up from below. He warned too that there were already well-organised lobby groups, sometimes
state-funded, in Brussels, one of which - Youth for a Federal Europe Group - funded partly by the Commission, had held a rally two days previously. He appealed to people to tell him their views, to get hold of the network which was being set up and would be on the Internet, so that they could at least say that they had tried, and he, as their indirect representative, could say that he had tried to get their views heard.

Mark Francois MP, European Research Group
He made two points about tactics for the campaign:

He felt that the campaign would be primarily a televisual campaign: people would mostly be influenced by what they saw on television.

Whilst those campaigning for the pound and the continuance of British self-government already had a strong lead amongst those people who had a firm view on the issue, there was a far larger number of people who had not made up their minds and it would be their views which would ultimately decide the outcome of any plebiscite. That being the case, he asked what the campaigners could do to persuade those people to vote for the continuance of British self-government: Should they run street stalls handing out literature and encouraging people to sign up in defence of sterling? Should they go round canvassing and seeking support for the defence of the pound? Should the campaign run an organisation on polling day and remind their supporters to go and vote? In his view the campaign should do these things. The logistics of running such a campaign were massive and the organisational work should begin pretty soon because it would only work as one unified national campaign. He urged the leadership of Congress to bear these points in mind in further discussions with Business for Sterling and the "No" Campaign.

Stuart Gulleford, Campaign for an Independent Britain
He said that he had been one of the organisers of the Campaign for an Independent Britain demonstration in the City on 2nd January, which he defended following Mr Glendening’s comments. They had not invited "John Bull" to take part, he had just joined them. The CIB had been the only voice heard that day in a tidal wave of euro propaganda and had achieved enormous coverage on national TV, on radio and in the national press. "John Bull" had not been the only element featured; there had been a coffin inscribed with "RIP: 12 Nation States killed by the Euro", which had been seen widely on TV and carried every hour on the hour for most of the day by satellite news channels. He also expressed concern at the phobia the Democracy Movement seemed to be developing about the Union Jack, which had featured widely at many of its own demonstrations. He thought it shameful and wildly impractical to suggest that people should not bring their Union Jacks to rallies and demonstrations in favour of the pound. Finally, he urged the Democracy Movement to get out and do something and to stop criticising organisations which did arrange demonstrations.

Paul Rhodes, Bruges Group
He had been reassured to hear the two previous speakers. He had heard some excellent speeches on many occasions but he felt it was now time to hear about strategy. He asked what the different groups, all with a common cause, were going to do in the next 6-12 months. Although a member of some of the groups, he had never been asked to do anything, but there were one or two people present who were often out on the streets talking to the public. He had been pleased to hear that in the Irish Republic the strategy which had succeeded had been to go house to house and try to convert people. He wanted to hear from members of the Congress about a co-ordinated action programme which would not lead to duplication of effort.

James Harvard, Youth for a Free Europe
He supported all those who had called for a continuing effort to bridge the differences with the "No" Campaign and produce some sort of unified umbrella group. He recommended an article in the latest edition of These Tides, suggesting a structure for such a group and a good name – Britain in the World, which he felt highlighted the Little European attitude of Britain in Europe, and thwarted those who would call the campaigners xenophobes. He suggested that if it were not possible to create an umbrella group with the "No" Campaign steps should be taken immediately to share resources and research with them, particularly to conduct message polls, in which the public’s reactions were sought to a series of slogans, statements and words. That way the effectiveness of the slogan "Euro No, Europe Yes" could be assessed. He also saw a possibility that the euro referendum would be sooner than expected – even as early as autumn 2002. He saw an urgent need for an umbrella group to be formed for the campaign: the "No" Campaign had a very good media profile and the Democracy Movement and others had people at the grass roots, and suggested that perhaps a third party could try to take forward the negotiations with the "No" Campaign.

David Wilkinson, These Tides
He made the point that when the referendum came the electorate would ask themselves what were the ultimate objectives of the proponents of the two arguments. When they looked at those advancing the cause of the euro they would see that they wanted an empire, a superstate, but some would see that they wanted good trade with neighbouring countries and sound economics. When they looked at those opposed to the euro they would see that they wanted to leave the EU, but it had been emphasised all morning that discussion of leaving the EU should be avoided during the campaign. He predicted that on that basis the referendum would certainly be lost, and urged that steps be taken quickly to develop a philosophy of how the modern nation state should interact with its neighbours, to show people that their ultimate objective was not so much to leave the European Union but to replace it with a better way – Europe without the Union.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch
He felt that some people had misunderstood the salient point of what he had been trying to suggest. It was absolutely clear that the official campaign to keep the pound had to reach out to those who wanted to stay in the EU but who could be persuaded to vote against EMU. That had to be the main strategy. There was good evidence that the Government and the Yes campaign intended to depict the anti-euro campaign as a front for leaving the European Union because all their focus groups were telling them that that strategy would cause the anti-euro campaign to lose. Those campaigning against the euro could not risk their being right about that and therefore, in his view, the anti-euro campaign should consist of groups which could not be accused of wanting to leave the EU. He thought it would probably be made up of Business for Sterling, New Europe, the Democracy Movement, LESC, the Greens, the Conservative Party, the Federation of Small Businesses, the Institute of Directors and possibly some trades unions, organisations which could not really be accused of come-outery. He had also suggested that those who were clearly identified as come-outers and proud of it should do what they could to support the "No" Campaign either as some new umbrella group or as satellites. That would leave those who wanted to leave the EU free to say what they thought without damaging the "No" Campaign, though he felt it likely that the constitutional issue would explode during the campaign.

Richard Bacon MP
He had recently been elected to Parliament; his reason for seeking election had been that it was cardinal to him that the British people retain in this country the right to govern themselves, to make their own laws, to set their own taxes and to sack their government. As with many parliamentarians, he expected to concentrate solely on the referendum when it was announced, but there was much to do before the announcement so that the campaign was ready to go. He had just returned from the Falklands, where people were very worried about the signal the Government’s negotiations with Spain on Gibraltar were sending to Argentina. There was no doubt of the power of those who would be campaigning to join the euro; he was determined that there should be no encroachment on the right of the people of this country to elect their own Members of Parliament, to make their own laws and determine their own destiny. He believed the referendum on the currency would explode into a constitutional and political debate. Although there were many people in the Conservative party who deplored the entire edifice of the European Union and would not mind seeing it tumble and the money funding it returned to the people to spend as they chose, during the referendum campaign his only interest would be to ensure that there was a crushing defeat for the prospect of Britain entering the single currency. He agreed with Lord Pearson that those in favour of joining the euro would seek to depict those opposed to the single currency as come-outers. He hoped that negotiations would continue and that a way forward would be found which did not allow the Congress to be depicted as controlling an agenda to leave the EU. That was not the main issue, which was to defeat any proposal that Britain join the single currency.

John Walker, Policy Chairman, Federation of Small Businesses
He expressed his disappointment that there were disagreements between the different organisations represented in the Congress, which was exactly what the Government wanted.

He saw the Electoral Commission potentially as more of a challenge than the referendum itself. Small businesses had come to realise that family-friendly policies and policies to protect the environment, which all sounded very good, merely resulted in an increase in red tape. He suspected that the same would be true of the Electoral Commission, which sounded all right but it could become an offence for an organisation not registered as part of the designated organisation to go out and express opinions or hand out leaflets. It was possible that there would not be a No campaign; there might not be a Yes or No answer, merely two options against which the electorate would have to put a tick. He felt that the powers of the Electoral Commission, particularly as they related to control over those who expressed opinions, should be investigated.

Derek Bennett, UKIP, Euro-Realist Newsletter
He referred to the comments made earlier by Sir Robin Williams on the inevitability factor. In his experience it was worth stressing that joining the euro was not inevitable if people voted No and suggested that that point be included in any slogan used by the anti-euro campaign. It was well known that when the referendum came the Government would try to fiddle and fix it, demonstrated by the arrangements for the funding available to each side through the Elections and Referendums Commission, so he suggested that people should be persuaded to threaten to withdraw all their cash from banks and building societies the day before the launch of the euro in this country, which could cause a serious problem for the Government and might make them postpone the deadline or prevent them going ahead with their plans.

Martin Harvey, Chairman, Broxbourne and Harlow branch of UKIP
It had been recommended earlier that the euro referendum should be kept separate from any question of whether Britain should remain in or leave the European Union. However, the discussion had now turned to what should be done after the referendum, and he warned that many powers had been lost to Europe since the first Congress, and there would shortly be further massive change to the British constitution, involving regionalisation, reform of the House of Lords and local government reform, all of which could result in the House of Commons having no power at all.

Secondly, he warned that there was no mention of the place of referendums in any of the EU Treaties; the rejection of the Nice Treaty in the referendum in Ireland did not seem to have prevented certain aspects of that Treaty being enshrined in law.

Finally, he warned that, although previously pressure groups had had considerable success, their effect was being reduced by the weakening of British institutions following changes in the law required by the EU. The only effective pressure remaining to the British people was their vote, which he urged people to give to the UKIP.

Clive Easton, Herefordshire Keep the Pound
He asked for assistance with practicalities; he was planning his summer schedule of activities but he needed a theme, an agreed message which he and his associates could use to attract the public to their stands. They had once had a petition, which had been very effective. He saw many well-meaning people at Congress, who had come together under the guidance of joint chairmen who had put an incredible effort into creating the coalition, but he felt Congress was merely a talking shop. Despite some differences, he thought Congress knew what had to be done – to get the message out, and he asked for a central message with which the public would wish to associate. He believed that the constitutional issues should be involved in the argument, but he was prepared to eliminate that element of the argument in order to attract middle England.

Dr Peter Oliver
He was hoping to deliver optimism to Lady Park, hoping to sneak in under the banner of a young person; he had never previously attended a political meeting but the issue of losing the pound had urged him to attend and even to speak. His point was simple: as he did not come from any political background he felt that nobody was really explaining to the electorate what it would mean to go into the euro and lose the pound. He saw a need to send a simple unified message to the man in the street outlining the economic reality in effective terms: joining the euro would mean standardised interest rates, that this country would no longer control an individual’s monthly mortgage payment.

Peter Goodchild, marketing consultant
As a marketing consultant he advised that in order to persuade a large number of people to a particular view it was necessary to find a "point of resonance", something which touched them. He did not feel that the British people would be inspired by the economic arguments, the constitutional arguments or the issue of sovereignty, none of which were generally understood. What really motivated people about currency was not which one they were using but how much they had. The British people were concerned about domination by foreigners, worried that their country might become controlled by other people, and that was the issue which would inspire the public. He recommended that the Congress should urgently talk to top advertising agencies who could express the argument linking domination by foreigners and the euro subtly and persuasively without laying the campaign open to claims of racism and xenophobia.

Dennis Delderfield, New Britain
He said that Mrs Guerrero had been thrilled with the response she had received from the Congress. The people of Gibraltar had thought that the British had abandoned them and would learn from her that they had not. On a practical basis he urged people to write to their MPs that day and tell them to support Gibraltar, to go to Gibraltar on holiday, and to write to their local newspaper expressing support for the inhabitants of Gibraltar. Gibraltar needed all the support it could get – immediately.

John Coleman, New European Publications
He said that seven years previously he had spoken to sixth formers, and one girl had asked why all the countries had not collectively left the European Union. At that time a Mintel poll had found that 70% of the British people were in favour of the European Community as it had been then, but had qualified their approval by saying that Britain should be able to make its own decisions – a very important point.

In the next issue of his publication there would be an interesting article by Dave Birch, called the e-Euro. It was quite clear that within the next decade up to 90% of people would be using electronic currency, and therefore the money spent by other Governments on minting new coins and printing new notes would be wasted. He argued that the point was worth making in the campaign, as was the point that the Chief Economist at the Bank of England seemed to be unsure as to which way he should vote in a referendum. He recommended the slogan: If you don’t know, vote No.

Richard Bellamy
He was speaking as an individual in reply to Lady Park’s point about websites. In the last general election he had run for the Grimsby and Cleethorpes constituencies two educational and totally impartial websites with the full co-operation of Austin Mitchell, one of the candidates. They had been very successful and had been publicly funded. He was currently in touch with the Electoral Commission to try to get accreditation for a totally impartial referendum site, which would be euroreferendum.org, if he succeeded. His proposal was to have an impartial educational site with facts and information, and two journalists from each side debating the different issues under the arbitration of, possibly, a professor from the Hansard Society. That way he saw a possibility of giving the public information which they would otherwise not receive.

Idris Francis
It was his view that events of the previous two weeks had made a euro-referendum less likely for two reasons: Mr Blair would find it increasingly difficult to convince the public to trust him; and Mr Brown, who had taken £5 billion away from the pensions industry and forced every sizeable company in the country to remove salary-linked pensions, had undermined the public’s belief in his competence.

Josephine Wilkins, Hon Secretary of the West Kent Democracy Movement
She felt that Congress could achieve a step forward in negotiations with other groups and asked to hear the wording of the motion drafted for approval by Congress.

Sir Michael Spicer read out the first motion on the referendum:

"The Seventh Congress for Democracy notes that the Congress has sought the views of the organisations campaigning against British entry to the single currency and that a clear majority of respondents expressed the view that the main campaigning organisations should work together in the referendum campaign.

The Seventh Congress for Democracy therefore resolves:

• that the official referendum campaign for the No side should be as inclusive as possible of the groups campaigning for an independent pound;

• that the referendum campaign should focus on the constitutional as well as the economic objections to Britain joining the single currency."

Sir Michael invited comments against the motion, which prompted the following:

Josephine Wilkins made the point that it would be wiser to concentrate on just one issue – the euro – and leave the constitutional arguments out of the debate.

Mr Michael May said that there would be a need to use the constitutional arguments in explaining why people should vote against the euro.

Brian Smalley suggested that the words "single currency" be changed to "economic and monetary union", to which Lord Stoddart replied that under the Maastricht Treaty Britain was already a member of EMU, but had an opt-out on the currency.

Peter Ellis wanted to include a reference to the fear of Franco-German domination.

Miss M Saville felt the motion was too long-winded, and urged that a national debate be encouraged on radio and television.

Rodney Atkinson suggested that the wording be changed to include the words "abolition of the pound".

Congress approved the amended motion as follows:

Sir Michael Spicer then read out the motion on the future of the Congress for Democracy, and invited comments from those opposed to that motion:

"The Seventh Congress for Democracy confirms the motion passed at its Fifth Congress and further resolves:

• that, as well as continuing to oppose British entry to the single currency, the Congress for Democracy will in future also consider and, where appropriate, take a view on other EU developments, particularly as they affect Britain’s constitutional and legal system;

• that the Congress will, in particular, consider matters arising from the Inter-Governmental Conferences and the Convention on the Future of Europe."

It was agreed without discussion that the words "abolition of the pound" should be included in the second resolution.

During further discussion Clive Easton suggested that it be inserted into the motion that Congress should continue to seek to be the central voice in the "No" Campaign.

Roger Pincham, former Chairman, Liberal Democrat Party, asked whether it could be possible to indicate in the second motion that Congress’s interest in democracy extended beyond the democratic rights of the people of Britain to the peoples of Europe, and to the people of all the nation states of the world.

Doug Nicholls, Community and Youth Workers’ Union, said that, whilst he felt there was likely to be only minority support for Congress to continue to press to be the umbrella organisation in the referendum campaign, there appeared to be consensus that Congress should continue to negotiate on the basis that the campaign needed to be inclusive and united, and he sought confirmation that such negotiations would continue.

Sir Michael replied that the first motion had included a phrase that the official campaign for the No side should be as inclusive as possible of the groups campaigning for an independent pound and that he, and he expected a few members of the agenda committee, had realised that the organisations whose representatives had spoken earlier had made the point that they would like to see further discussions.

Clive Easton asked that a vote be held on the motion that Congress should continue to seek to be the umbrella organisation in the referendum campaign. On a show of hands, the motion was defeated by 52 votes to 39. (Others present abstained).

David Wilkinson argued that Congress should report in future on the Convention, and should consider what service it could provide to alert people to the progress of discussions in the Convention.

Congress approved the second motion amended as follows:

Rodney Atkinson
He raised again the power vested in the Electoral Commission and urged Congress to consider a motion that it and its constituent members should write to the Commission to make three basic points:

• that the Government must not be allowed to campaign and be funded separately in addition to its own membership of the Yes campaign;
• that Yes and No should not be the answers to any referendum question, but that the choice should be between competing statements;
• that the full implication and meaning of the question must be explained in a referendum.

Sir Michael assured him that his points would be put to the next meeting of the Agenda Committee.

Ron Dorman expressed the hope that some sort of comprehensive organisation would have to be set up for the anti-euro side in the referendum campaign and that those on the committee running any such organisation should be elected by their own organisations. He also believed that all groups which wanted to participate in the anti-euro campaign should not be denied the opportunity to do so.

Sir Michael said that he could not speak about democracy within the "No" Campaign, but the point had been taken that a number of organisations on the left of the spectrum were currently being excluded from the campaign. That point would be raised in future discussions with the "No" Campaign.

Julia Barnes saw the possible abolition of the currency in terms of a risk to the monarchy. According to the Bible allegiance was due to the person whose head was on the coinage. Britain did not have a political head of state and she felt that part of the objective of the move to integrate further into Europe could be to undermine the monarchy.

Idris Francis mentioned that he had available copies of a 50-minute video entitled "The European Union and Britain – the Facts". It was non-party political and, being free of copyright, could be copied and circulated.

Finally, Hazel Woolfson, a supporter of Congress from the beginning who had been unable to attend previous meetings, said she felt there was not enough emotion in the debate. Saying No was always less convincing than saying Yes; she urged that campaigners should say No, No, No.

Closing the Congress Sir Michael Spicer said that he expected there would be a further Congress in the autumn*. He thanked everyone for coming.

* The date of the Eighth Congress for Democracy was subsequently arranged for
Friday 1 November 2002.