Session 1:

Welcoming everyone, particularly those from Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Estonia, to the Eighth Congress for Democracy, Sir Michael Spicer MP said that Austin Mitchell MP was suffering from flu and had regretfully had to send his apologies, but that Lord Stoddart of Swindon had kindly agreed to chair the first sessions. Lord Stoddart described himself as a poor substitute for Austin Mitchell and said he was sure Congress would join him in wishing Austin Mitchell a speedy recovery from his flu.

The Euro Referendum

Lord Stoddart introduced Dr Brian Burkitt, Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Department of Applied Social Sciences and Director of the European Economies Research Unit at the University of Bradford, and Andy Mullen, PhD student, also at the University of Bradford. They had written The Euro: The Battle for British Hearts and Minds, published that day and available at the Congress.

Dr Brian Burkitt, University of Bradford

Although the Euro was not in itself more important than all the constitutional issues raised by the Convention on the Future of Europe, it was important because the referendum would present an opportunity for the British people to slow down European integration. He believed that a decisive No vote (55/45) would settle the matter for a decade.

Although Mr Blair was currently prevented from holding a referendum by public opinion, Dr Burkitt warned against complacency because he feared that a popular victory (for instance, over the firefighters’ strike or in Iraq) might prompt him to call a referendum. He said that the anti-Euro campaign was in a stronger position than that against the EEC had been in 1975, giving five reasons: a major political party would campaign for a No vote; there was a substantial body of opinion opposed to the Euro in the Labour Party; four leading national daily newspapers supported the campaign; opinion polls had shown a majority against the Euro for two years; and over the last ten years, outside the Euro and the ERM, Britain had consistently outperformed all the countries in Europe preparing for and achieving entry into the single currency. Despite all these advantages, he urged campaigners for the pound not to be complacent.

The Euro was not mainly a matter of economics. It concerned democratic politics. If Britain joined the Euro all the decision-making institutions would cease to be accountable to the British people and there would be no opportunity to get rid of them. The people were in grave danger of losing their democracy: the turnout in the last two elections had been exceptionally low, particularly amongst the 18-25 age group. It was vital to re-connect the new generation with democratic values. This would be difficult with the existing democratic rights but almost impossible if Britain entered the Euro and gave those rights to unelected, unaccountable bankers and bureaucrats.

Lord Stoddart thanked Brian Burkitt for his lucid explanation of the issues involved in any Euro referendum and for his call to discussion and action.

He asked whether Brian Burkitt seriously expected that a No vote would be respected for ten years, suggesting that it would be more like ten months.

Brian Burkitt replied that he thought it would depend on the size of the margin: if the vote were 51/49 or 53/47 he was sure that the europhiles would try to re-open the issue as soon as possible. He felt that if the margin were 55/45 it would have to be respected at least for one and probably for two Parliaments.

He asked how Brian Burkitt felt the No campaign could engage the minds of the 18-25 age group in a single issue if they did not even bother to exercise their democratic rights in general elections.

Brian Burkitt said that he had learned from experience that constituency association meetings of all parties attracted small audiences with an average age of over 60 and he had noticed that his students were less interested in politics than previous generations had been. He found that enthusiastic repetition of the arguments usually rubbed off.

Andy Mullen said that he was often surprised by his contemporaries’ ignorance about political issues and suggested that publicity like the No campaign’s recent cinema advertising might be effective in targeting the younger audience.

He asked the speakers to comment on the intellectual and cultural content of the campaign. He expected the referendum campaign to be extremely dirty with the No campaign portrayed as people living in the past, motivated by xenophobic ideas. Those on the No side would have to be very careful with whom they associated and should take care to present themselves as internationalists, people who had a broader vision for Britain. Otherwise, he warned, they would lose the votes of the younger generation and of middle-ground opinion.

Brian Burkitt agreed that simply saying "No" would not be enough; it would be important to present positive alternative policies. Together with colleagues at Bradford he had published an article outlining monetarist and Keynesian economic policies without the Euro. He felt that the eurosceptic movement as a whole should produce positive alternatives in the fields of defence, foreign policy and international relations.

Without being complacent, he felt that the No side was easily winning the argument on the issues on the right of centre of British politics. He was much more concerned about those on the left because many people considered themselves to be internationalists but defined euroscepticism as a right-wing cause with which they did not want to be associated.

He asked whether the speakers were concerned that the British Government would learn how to rig the vote from the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty.

Andy Mullen said that the Government would have been watching that referendum with interest but, despite their policy of "wait and see", they had been preparing for British entry to the Euro for several years. Brian Burkitt quoted a reply by Robin Cook, then Foreign Secretary, to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, that if the British people voted Yes in a referendum the planning had to be in place, whereas there were no plans for action following a No vote in a referendum.

He felt it was necessary to devise a strategy for the possible Euro referendum and to consider the factors which could win or lose it. Fewer people were voting in elections and, he felt that they were discouraged from voting because all three political parties wanted Britain to be at the heart of the European Union. He recommended that those against the Euro should remain on their guard and remember that the press was fickle. Clear and simple alternative policies in all areas should be devised and communicated effectively to people. He stressed that an organisation should be set up immediately; there was already a group in Birmingham, another due to open in Derby the following month and others forming. He also said that something should be done about the Trade Union leaderships.

Andy Mullen said that from the strategic point of view one of the main lessons from the Danish referendum had been diversity. It had proved almost impossible to form a single umbrella organisation because people had found it very difficult to speak with one voice.

He felt that in order to get the message across to the broad spectrum of people it was more important to concentrate on the bread-and-butter issues of joining the Euro. Little emphasis had been placed on the costs of joining the Euro, particularly to small businesses, which he had always considered a very influential sector. It should also be emphasised that going into the Euro would put up prices; inflation in France had definitely increased since its introduction.

Brian Burkitt agreed, saying that he had had a very good response to an article he had written for the journal of the Federation of Small Businesses.

Lord Stoddart then introduced John Cryer, MP for Hornchurch, Secretary of Labour Against The Euro, and a member of the Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign.

He explained that LATE had been formed specifically for members of the Parliamentary Labour Party to encourage the great mass of the PLP (not the 30-40 utterly committed to each side) to take part in the campaign against the single currency. It would also put pressure on the trade unions to act in accordance with decisions made at their conferences. He felt that the unions would play an important role in the referendum on the single currency and that it was important to ensure that they did not go along with whatever was suggested by the party leadership, as had happened in 1975.

He felt that the debate needed to be mature and reasoned and criticised the other side for the juvenile and unsophisticated manner in which they had reacted to the formation of LATE. He was also surprised at the appointment of the new Minister for Europe, Denis MacShane, whom he remembered vociferously opposing the publication of a booklet against the Euro some years previously.

He was opposed to the single currency because he was an internationalist. The single currency was about taking democracy, the right to elect a government and to self-determination, from the people and vesting it in a tiny unelected elite forever. Joining the single currency would be irrevocable and he predicted that it would not be long before there was a demand to grant to the European Central Bank control over taxation – no single currency had ever existed without such power. The political parties in the UK would then be powerless to control the economy. He felt the essence of the Euro project was summed up in the undemocratic nature of the ECB, which did not publish the voting record of board members for fear of pressure from their fellow-countrymen.

He suggested to Congress five key tests (not the Treasury’s five tests) put forward by Tony Benn, questions which should always be asked of those with political power: What power have you got? Who gave it to you? To whom are you accountable? On whose behalf have you exercised it? and, most importantly, How do we get rid of you? That, he said, was the key question for the Board of the ECB and the European Commission: only the Council of Ministers, which met in secret, could get rid of them. These unaccountable bodies were already interfering with the British economy and the British Government. The picture of the European Union as a liberal institution smiling benignly on the world was a fantasy, particularly in respect of the Third World.

He was worried that, should Britain join the single currency and her politicians become powerless, there would be a marked rise in support for extreme political parties. He did not think the Labour Party was as enthusiastic about the single currency as it appeared; the party was deeply divided on the issue. He thought the leadership’s enthusiasm for the Euro stemmed from a lack of self-confidence and a mistaken belief that attachment to Europe would boost their position. He urged the British political leaders in all parties to rediscover their self-confidence and believe that they could make decisions affecting the lives of the British people without assistance from any other institution.

Thanking John Cryer, Lord Stoddart said that he felt Congress had heard the voice of democratic Labour, not that of the centralising New Labour, which was now in Government. He felt that Mr Cryer had shown that it was possible to be an internationalist and a patriot at the same time and that the issue transcended party politics.

He reminded people about the existence of the Electoral Commission arrangements, which were supposed to make the referendum campaign much fairer than before in terms of funding and television time. He was worried that the events in Ireland surrounding the second referendum on the Nice Treaty could set a precedent for what could happen in Britain. For the second Nice referendum the framework which had ensured a fair debate in the first referendum had been swept away, resulting in much higher expenditure on the Yes side than the No side (20:1). This inevitably made it much easier for the Government to achieve their desired result. He asked Dr Burkitt how important he felt it would be to keep the Electoral Commission arrangements in place and how likely he thought they were to be eroded.

Brtian Burkitt said he thought it was a danger. There was no doubt that the Yes campaign in Ireland had outspent the No campaign by possibly as much as 25:1, nor that the question and the independent commission leaflet delivered free to all households had been worded so that the Yes side had a clear advantage. Even if the Electoral Commission could be held to its terms of reference, the Government would still have an advantage, but the No campaign could push to have equal expenditure limits.

She welcomed John Cryer’s remarks about the Labour Party sharpening up its act and encouraging the trade unions to oppose the Euro. There was currently great rejoicing in her own union over the removal of a europhile leader, who had ignored his members in his support for the Euro. The new leader, Derek Simpson, had pronounced himself neither for nor against the Euro but, if asked to vote immediately, would vote No because of the democratic deficit. She was alarmed that some eurosceptics in the Labour Party and in the trade union movement supported reform, which would bring a semblance of democracy to the European Union. The fundamental reason for opposing the Euro was the loss of sovereignty, the ability to deal with our own affairs, the issue which the Labour Party and the trade union movement should tackle.

John Cryer agreed that the European Union would attempt to take on a vague democratic structure, probably through renegotiation of the Stability Pact, which he expected to be replaced by something pernicious, controlled through the back door. The Stability Pact put very tight controls on Governments on convergence and he expected that in return the ECB and the Commission might demand the right to vet budget proposals prior to their announcement in each individual country. He said he was delighted in the change of leadership in Amicus.

He asked what the europhiles would gain if Britain joined the single currency. It could not be power because that would reside in the hands of a very small group.

John Cryer thought that the europhiles were self-deluded. When he pointed out the lack of democracy and the centralisation of a superstate, the corruption and the nepotism, they countered with the wonders of the European Social Model.

Like Britain, one-third of his company’s sales were to North America, a third to Europe and a third to the rest of the world. They had opened a Euro account when the Euro was formed, but had hardly used it. They also had dollar and sterling accounts. Although 41%- 50% of business was done with the EU, only a small percentage (probably about 20%) was conducted in the European currency. He had been engaged in fostering a shift in opinion, away from their pro-Euro stance, within the CBI and the Engineering Employers Federation, making them aware of the measures which would come with the Euro. He was very concerned to see that within the professions (lawyers, bank managers and financial consultants) in Britain there was a great deal of ignorance about the implications of the loss of sovereignty for the country and saw a great need to get the No campaign’s views across to those people.

Brian Burkitt greeted his remarks as an immensely valuable contribution: there were constant arguments about how much trade was done with Europe and the figure depended on how it was measured, but no one ever said that only about a fifth of British trade was done in Euros. He was encouraged by the movement in business opinion against the Euro - even the CBI, which, under Adair Turner, had supported joining the single currency, now had no view on the issue and had no intention of consulting its members.

Although the Government continuously stated that the Euro was more important than the dollar to foreign trade, Global Britain’s latest Briefing Note (No 21) proved that the US dollar was in fact some 50% more important. He urged people to shoot down the absurd Government propaganda that 60% of trade depended on membership of the European Union, recently changed to 60% of trade is linked to membership of the EU. The fact was that less than 10% of the UK economy was involved in trade with the single market. Some 20% of economic activity went in foreign trade of any kind, 11% with non-EU trade and about 9% or less with the single market. He asked why Britain should contemplate giving up the control of interest rates, the economy and, indeed, the rest of her sovereignty for less than 10% of her economic activity.

He said that he had recently met some activists from Canada, fighting to preserve the Canadian dollar from being taken over by the US dollar. He argued that it was important for the No campaign to ensure that all those associated with it had a firm belief in internationalism – the nation and democracy.

He asked whether there was a danger that Mr Blair, after all the talk of a referendum in the next 2-3 years would promise as part of his manifesto to take Britain into the Euro if he won the next election.

John Cryer thought that unlikely. He was not clear how enthusiastic Mr Blair was about the Euro, but Governments wanted to retain power and because he did not expect the polls, reporting a 60/30 split against the Euro, to change, he saw such a policy as an immense political risk. He would not say that the Prime Minister was not going to hold a referendum, but pointed out that as the next General Election grew nearer, the time available for a referendum grew less because the loss of a referendum would necessitate a long recovery time before a General Election.

Brian Burkitt added that the polls had been consistent for ten years, but recently a second question had been asked: "Would you still vote the same way if the current Government argued strongly for a Yes vote?"; the No vote then dropped, but only by 4 to 5 percentage points.

He said that the main point to get across to the whole of the UK was the cost of the Euro. The recent Nice referendum in Ireland had been bought by Brussels: staging a referendum cost about £55m and politicians, who had been elected to represent the people, considered them pointless. In addition, people should be made aware that Britain, as a law-abiding member state, would have to finance the expansion of the EU. He saw a need to stress more firmly the fact that people’s pockets and decentralisation were the most important issues in order to preserve sovereignty in Britain.

He said he was delighted to see so many Labour people on the platform and asked if they accepted that the European Union was a largely fascist/German imperialist organisation. He asked whether this did not provide an opportunity for the Labour movement to swing massively against the Euro and the institutions behind it.

John Cryer said that he did not agree that it was a German plot, but a plot by the political and economic elite of Western Europe to seize power and make sure that they do not have to be held accountable for their actions.

Concluding the session, Lord Stoddart thanked the speakers and those who had taken part in the discussion from the floor.

Introducing the session on constitutional matters, Sir Michael Spicer reminded those present of the resolution passed at the Seventh Congress for Democracy:

The Seventh Congress for Democracy confirms the motion passed at its Fifth Congress and further resolves:

• that, as well as continuing to oppose the abolition of the pound, the Congress for Democracy will in future also consider and, where appropriate, take a view on other EU developments, particularly as they affect Britain’s constitutional and legal system;

• that the Congress will, in particular, consider matters arising from the Inter-Governmental Conferences and the Convention on the Future of Europe."

He said that there would be two distinguished speakers, after which there would be open discussion. He introduced first Martin Howe QC, a member of the Congress’s Constitutional Committee, an expert on European law and an author of many pamphlets.

He said that Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had presented earlier in the week to the Constitutional Convention a draft of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. He was in no doubt that most members of the Convention considered the drafting of a Constitution for Europe as a profound act with far-reaching consequences, while the British Foreign Secretary likened it to writing a Constitution for a golf club. The draft Constitution was only an outline and its provisions were subject to amendment by the Convention or the member states.

Article 1 of the draft Constitution stated that the European Union would become a "union of European states which, while retaining their national identities, closely co-ordinate their policies at the European level and administer certain common competences on a federal basis". He pointed out that the Constitution would represent a major change from the position of the current treaties, under which the European Union and its institutions were international organisations established by treaty between the member states, and their powers were limited to the competences conferred on them by the member states. A Constitution defined, limited and shared out powers between the Union and the member states. Article 1 also set out alternative names – European Union, European Community, United States of Europe or United Europe.

He said that there was an argument about whether or not the European Union was, or would become, a state. It effectively had a federal system of law, a citizenship, a clearly defined external frontier and a common system of visa control on foreign nationals who crossed the frontier. It also had an executive, a legislature, a judicial system, its own currency and common economic policy, a common foreign and security policy and developing armed forces. In short, the European Union already possessed many of the features of a state recognised by international law.

He warned that the Constitution could lead to a weakening or removal of the member states’ right of veto on the extension of certain powers and would abolish the existing three pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty. Foreign policy and criminal and judicial matters would become supranational in their handling, and a new post of President of the European Council would be created. The Charter of Fundamental Rights would be given some form of legal effect under the Constitution.

The Constitution lacked any real commitment to democracy; a uniform procedure would be laid down for elections to the European Parliament, which, he surmised, would further insulate the Parliament from any real accountability to the electors.

He said that he thought that it was time to recognise that it would be impossible to halt, let alone reverse, the headlong rush to integration within the European Union. Even if the draft Constitution were diluted or blocked, the powers taken under the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice provided scope for further integration. He appreciated that there were groups within the Congress whose view was that the only solution was to leave the EU, but, leaving that aside, he felt the only way forward was to work actively for some form of outer tier or associate membership, which would enable those states who did not wish to participate in all aspects of the European Union to continue to be associated with it in areas of their choice. He realised that formulating such proposals would be difficult, and would be subject to the challenge that "associate" members would be subject to decisions in which they could not participate, but he felt that if Congress were to move forward on constitutional issues it should seek to explore such solutions.

Sir Michael Spicer thanked Martin Howe for his chilling assessment of current activities on the constitutional front. In response to a suggestion from the floor, he invited Anthony Coughlan to explain why the Irish had changed their minds in the second referendum on the Nice Treaty.

He explained that the situation with the second referendum on the Nice Treaty had been very different from the first in two respects: the financial support available and the wording of the question.

In the first referendum campaign the Referendum Commission had given substantial amounts of public money to both Yes and No sides, but as the Irish Government had recently taken that function away from it there had been no public money for either side in the second referendum. The Yes side was, however, supported extensively by private advertising and it was estimated that the ratio of money spent on advertising was 15:1 on the Yes side.

For the second referendum, although the constitutional changes were identical to those required in the first referendum, the Irish Government had introduced a second part to the question referring to the requirement for a referendum in Ireland if the EU should ever form a defence pact. The questions were linked and had to be answered together: it was not possible to answer Yes to one and No to the other.

The No vote had increased slightly in the referendum, but so had the turnout, from 35% to 48%; the increase in turnout had been mainly on the Yes side.

Sir Michael Spicer commented that Anthony Coughlan’s comments fitted very much into the context of the warnings against complacency heard in the earlier session.

He agreed with Brian Burkitt that the No side were winning the argument, but he felt that their cultural image was lacking in impact. The key to improving that image and making it more attractive to younger voters was, he argued, to make the point that they were the internationalists and theirs was the modern forward-looking vision for Britain. The internet, better telecommunications, and faster, cheaper transport made any country in the world a potential partner for Britain and the obsession with a narrow group of countries in the same part of the world was out of place in the 21st century.

He saw no chance that the Convention would consider any alternative proposals, nor did he think it likely that any national government would oppose the Convention’s recommendations. He feared that those recommendations would have no impact on the general public, who were not inspired by detailed constitutional points. He recommended a programme consisting of three fundamental revisions to the Treaties, which he felt anybody could understand. They were:

• "National Parliaments must have the last word on laws to be imposed within their territories;

• Nations must have the right to withdraw in whole or part from the Treaties by
  following agreed procedures. (This provision dealt with those issues that did not involve domestic legislation.)

• The use of the European Court of Justice to extend the competences of the EU must be brought to an end."

He thought that some people might be surprised to learn that these powers were no longer held nationally, and suggested that a popular campaign in the lead-up to the IGC would challenge the europhiles to defend the current situation in the EU. Before then, however, the case for the reforms would have to be developed and argued individually in each member state; in Britain it would be based on history and the constitution. He asked Congress to authorise the preparation of such a case for discussion at the next Congress in the spring, which might be constituted as a "UK Convention for EU Reform", providing the basis for a campaign to oppose a European Constitution by promoting a sane alternative.

Sir Michael Spicer then introduced the Rt Hon David Heathcoat-Amory MP, one of the two representatives from the British Parliament to the Convention on the Future of Europe, also Chairman of the European Research Group and on the Agenda Committee of the Congress for Democracy. Inviting him to report back to Congress from the Convention, Sir Michael reminded those present that David Heathcoat-Amory had recently walked out of the EPP group on the Convention.

He said that he was worried about the draft Constitution which had been described by Martin Howe. The endowment of the Union with a single legal personality and the collapse of the intergovernmental pillars, dealing with foreign policy, defence, criminal justice and policing, were big issues. A European state would be created. Moreover, it was likely that the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which had been dismissed just over a year earlier as having no legal significance, would be legally incorporated in the Constitution. These moves had to be resisted and positive alternatives put forward.

He believed that there should be a democracy founded on the rights of national parliaments; there was currently a technocratic structure with a veneer of democratic legitimacy in that it was accountable to Ministers and to the Council of Europe. The European Parliament was not a true parliament because there was no European electorate; in practice it was run by officials and decisions were taken by the 496 working committees, which published neither agendas nor minutes. Enlargement of the Union was threatened by the slowdown in the Germany economy; all previous enlargements had been funded by the German taxpayer and now, due to the Euro, the Germans had no political control over their own economy, which was weak. Also, the unelected Commission was determined to retain its right of initiative over laws and proposals.

He thought the Commission should become a secretariat, serving the wishes of the Council and of the national parliaments, for which it would work up proposals when requested. As a secretariat, it should be headed by a Chief Clerk. If the Convention were genuinely interested in closing the gap between the rulers and the ruled he thought they should be considering such changes, but there was no evidence of this in the Constitution.

The rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights were much more extensive than those in the European Convention on Human Rights and he feared that through its inclusion in the Constitution the EU would acquire competences in a whole range of fields, such as healthcare, education and training, and consumer and environmental protection, none of which had anything to do with the EU.

The centralisation of power and erosion of self-government had to be fought. Under the Constitution foreign policy, defence, policing and criminal justice would become Community competences, but there was no unified European foreign policy and the issues of use of force (either abroad or at home) and criminal justice were fundamentally the responsibilities of a nation state. It was even being proposed that immigration should become a full EU competence. He did not want to live in any country where such decisions were made by bureaucrats and not by the people, but that would be the effect of the Constitution. He was going to fight it. With a few allies who believed in founding a democracy on the national parliaments, he was working on an alternative to the expected outcome of the Convention; he would not be signing up to Giscard’s Constitution.

(The full text of David Heathcoat-Amory’s speech is available here.)

Thanking David Heathcoat-Amory, Sir Michael commented that one of the groups to which he was attached was Danish and that representatives from that group would be speaking later in the morning.

He said that his party had attempted to place advertisements in publications read by students. Their advertisements had been accepted by the Spectator, Prospect and the House Magazine, but had been refused by Historical Review and Political Quarterly because, he alleged, New Labour supporters were on the editorial staff. He wondered whether the Congress ought to form a study group to counteract such interference.

He said that the Convention itself was undemocratic and that it should be attacked now on that basis. He asked whether there had been any consultation between Government and people in the 15 member states about the subjects to be raised at the Convention, whether the members of the Convention were in touch with their national Parliaments, and whether the people in the member states would have an opportunity to vote on the recommendations of the Convention. He urged people to make these points now to undermine the Convention’s democratic legitimacy. They should also hammer home the point that the European Union was an undemocratic institution, and had been ever since its inception in 1957. He was worried that the Constitution would be regulated and interpreted by the European Court of Justice, which would represent an extension of the powers of the centralising institutions. It appeared that the veto would become extinct, possibly even by the time the Constitution proposed by the Convention was put to the Heads of Governments, and he expected that whatever emerged from the Convention would be incorporated in a Treaty and not put before the British Parliament until it had been signed. After that the British people would be committed forever to the terms of the Treaty. He asked whether it would not be possible, therefore, to argue that if a Constitution emerged from the Convention it must be put to a referendum of the British people.

The Rt Hon David Heathcoat-Amory MP said that the Convention was not a representative body; euroscepticism was dramatically underrepresented. The only safeguard would be a final referendum, which would be a matter for each Member State. He would strongly urge one in Britain but it would only make sense if there were choices. It would not be right on a take-it-or-leave-it basis because then the Government would say that they had tried to safeguard the British position and it was an acceptable package to which there was no alternative. That was why he and others were working on an alternative. He asked for legal advice on whether they could insist on a referendum because it would disturb the 1972 European Communities Act. He felt that if it could be argued that the whole basis of the EEC and Britain’s relationship with it would be altered, there would be legal as well as political grounds for arguing for a referendum.

Martin Howe said that, whatever the political case for a referendum, the legal case was quite weak because under the British Constitution Parliament had the power to do anything, including handing over powers.

From Martin Howe’s speech he had learned that, despite the 2:1 objection in the public as a whole, Britain was slipping inexorably towards a federated superstate. He did not think it could be stopped without the Government being opposed and the population being moved by newspapers which continued to campaign against the EU and its development. He felt, however that the enlargement could stop it. Many supported the enlargement for two reasons : firstly, because they felt it would encourage democracy and free enterprise in the Eastern European states, and secondly because it would dilute the European Union. He urged Congress to devote some attention to that aspect. He could not believe that the applicant countries wanted to become again a part of a federated superstate. They wanted to be proud nation states. He asked whether Congress could not do more, go to the ten countries proposing to join the European Union for the economic and political benefits and work up their hostility to the federated superstate. He expressed his willingness to help because he saw that course of action as Britain’s main source of salvation.

Sir Michael Spicer said that although Congress tried to establish links with other countries there was neither the system nor the budget for travel. It was, however, possible that study groups would be set up to advance matters and he hoped that Sir Ivan would participate.

She agreed with those who had spoken of the need to build an alternative for two reasons: to expose the real agenda regarding the Constitution, and to make it more public in order to show that the issue was not just Yes or No. She warned that time was slipping away and that it was essential to get the message across in language which related to people’s everyday lives.

If a Constitution for a state called Europe, which the British Government would almost certainly support, was to be put on the table in 2004, then surely the matter of a referendum should also be raised. She asked David Heathcoat-Amory if he was worried that the abolition of referendums in the European state might be part of the new Constitution. If that were the case, on the issues of the single currency and regional government, the Government would simply have to wait until 2005, win the General Election and vote in the new European Treaty with a large majority. After that, there would be nothing those opposed to further European integration could do.

David Heathcoat-Amory confirmed that all the candidate countries, the ten who were supposed to be joining in 2 years time, plus Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, were represented on the Convention and efforts were made to get to know them and to spot the eurosceptic elements. Many, having been ruled from Moscow, did not want to be ruled from Brussels, but most of them had a political élite which were keen to join an even bigger élite. There was pressure on them to join and seek a larger union, but he and his colleagues were trying to work with the forces of democracy in those countries.

He agreed with Angela Browning that the language used should be easily understood by people. He did not believe it was necessary to be politically sophisticated to understand that one of your basic rights was to assent to who rules you. The British could not give up this right, it was against their basic instincts as a people, as citizens who wanted control over their own affairs. Moreover, recent referendums in Denmark and Ireland had exploded in the faces of the Eurocrats, although the Irish had been bullied into agreeing on the second occasion. If there were ever a referendum in Britain on the Euro it was essential that the Government agree to accept a No vote as the outcome because otherwise there would be referendums on the Euro until the people said Yes.

He urged people to ask their MPs for the papers, which were available to British MPs, relating to the Convention, the reports to the British Parliament from its two representatives and the minutes of the joint Committee of the Lords and Commons. Reading these reports would make clear how democracy was being filched away. Moreover, he said, the Convention was not primarily a group of representatives of national Parliaments: there were only two from the UK. There were also representatives from the UK Government, from the Commission and from the European Parliament.

The British Constitution enabled Acts of Parliament to provide prerogative powers to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which would all be lost to the European Central Bank if Britain joined the Euro. He did not believe that the population understood this; they saw the Euro as a convenience which meant they would not have to change their money when going on holiday. He feared that the powers of the Chancellor and those of the Bank of England would be transferred en masse without much debate in Parliament, using existing regulations or a tiny tweaking of the Act. He hoped that Congress could accept Lionel Bell’s idea, which he thought had had the support of the four previous speakers, and include in it the way in which the Constitution was being sold out.

He encouraged members of Congress to hold to account their elected representatives in Parliament, their MPs. During 14 years in Parliament there had been many issues on which his constituents had not questioned him; he had wanted the local press or radio to ask him how he justified certain decisions but it had not happened. He observed that the average backbencher could have a very quiet life as long as he voted with his party, but this had to change. MPs should be made to answer for their actions by their constituents. The Government had indicated in a written answer to Lord Stoddart that once inside the single currency it was impossible to leave. He felt good questions for Members of Parliament would be: Do you agree with voting to join something you cannot leave? Do you believe in the institution of a European Arrest Warrant, which does away with habeas corpus, the freedoms we have enjoyed for centuries? He did not think that young people would become involved in politics until individual MPs were prepared to stand up and say what they believed in.

He felt that many people did not know anything about the single currency or the European Union; all they knew was that it would be easier to change money when going abroad. He was concerned that Britain would not have a two-way referendum like the Irish.

His main concern was to raise interest among young people. In Reading they had worked on creating a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society; they had noticed that people came to this country from the Commonwealth because they valued the rights of British (not European) citizenship. He thought that a vital point to make to young people was that they needed to protect their democracy in order to be members of a fully-functioning British democracy in the future, not of a European democracy.

He said that David Heathcoat-Amory had made a very great contribution on the committee referred to by Nigel Spearing and that at the last meeting he had made a spirited defence of democracy and the freedom of this country. Unfortunately only about twenty Parliamentarians had been present, of which five or six were from the House of Lords. He endorsed the point that people should make their MPs pay attention to this issue.

For the last 27 years the Campaign for an Independent Britain, of which he was Chairman, had been ridiculed for warning people that they were heading towards a United States of Europe. Now, Giscard d’Estaing wanted to institute a United States of Europe, not a federal Europe, but a unitary state and an empire of Europe. All who believed in freedom and democracy in this country should get the gloves off; they were far too polite to those who treacherously wished to submit Britain to government from outside this country, not elected by this country and which could not be dismissed by this country; it used to be called treason. Britain had fought two wars to prevent that happening and yet the people’s elected representatives were giving away the democracy, freedom and institutions which had been built up over hundreds of years.

He said that political leadership was needed from one party, the campaign could not afford for the political parties to be united on this. He called on the Tory Party, the constitutional party, to lead the campaign, in co-operation with any other groups who would save the country from being taken over by a United States of Europe. He said it could not be done by a quiet man or a party which believed they were hated by the population. The Tory Party had to have confidence in itself in order to lead the fight to save the country. There was a responsibility on every individual in the room and everyone in the country who believed in democracy to mobilise millions of people and hold marches and rallies which would make those of CND and the Countryside Alliance look like small meetings.

He said that he believed the Congress should oppose the EU’s proposed Convention but he saw no point in setting up an alternative Convention because the EU was an organisation which he and others wanted to leave. He thought that the EU was very set in its ways and he saw proposals for reform as wishful thinking. Enlargement of the EU would, he believed, make it worse, more unstable and more dangerous, the seed-bed of new wars, and he saw great danger in being involved in it. The Congress for Democracy should, however, continue to assert the democracy and the sovereignty of the British people.

He asked how the lack of transparency of the EU, matched by the naivety of so many politicians, leaders of industry and even lawyers could be changed.

All of the speakers had been clear about what the Congress supported; he proposed that it should firmly state its opposition to institutional European dictatorship. He believed that the simple dichotomy between democracy, supported by Congress, and institutional European dictatorship was one which would resonate with everybody in any referendum campaign. He also proposed that that dichotomy should be enshrined in a resolution of Congress, and that alternative names for the organisation proposed by the Convention could be a "European dictatorship" or a "European empire".

He published a magazine which encouraged people to be part of the international struggle against the European Union. People from Slovenia and Malta had been at previous Congresses asking for solidarity and support; today there were present two gentlemen from Estonia, guests of the Anti-Common Market league. He appealed for funds to help with their think-tanks in Estonia, saying that £1,000 would put on a conference which would have a tremendous impact. He encouraged members of the Congress to go to Estonia and to support those in the applicant countries opposed to the EU.

He thought that in the Convention the EU had provided an opportunity to take a more aggressive form of euroscepticism, to launch a counter-attack with a vision of how the modern state interacts with its neighbours. When campaigning for the pound or against the new Constitution, people should have an idea for the future of a post-EU Europe. When opposing the Convention neither precise defensive objections to their proposals, nor an alternative, which would just be ignored, would work as well as a positive vision which could be given to the people.

He thanked David Wilkinson for his speech. He thought that perhaps Estonia, or the Baltic States, might be the place where the federal monster could be stopped. There was a strong feeling among the population that a new federation was coming into force and they were concerned that the United States of Europe, the creation of which could not longer be hidden, might be the Soviet Union of the future.

He pointed out that Anthony Blair was only the Prime Minister of Her Majesty’s Government, not head of state, and that he needed the Queen’s consent. The Dominions Act 1931 required that as the Queen was head of state of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the consent of those countries’ Parliaments had to be given before any change was made. Britain could not go any further into a United States of Europe without their permission, and he suggested that their veto be enlisted.

She was concerned at the way in which the unions were moving into the campaign. In 1975 they had been against remaining in the Common Market but they had been very troublesome during the campaign and had alienated the support of the middle classes. She warned that if the unions were going to campaign against the single currency they must behave; otherwise she thought the campaign would do better without them.

He said that Christopher Gill and David Stoddart had shown that there was still passion in politics, and that John Cryer had shown that the differences in the Labour Party were equivalent to those in the Conservative Party and that there was no need for everyone to campaign on the same message. He could not understand why after 50 years of tyranny under the Soviet Union, Estonia wanted to become part of a bureaucracy from Brussels. On the percentage of trade, his information was that many of the figures included goods and services exported through Antwerp and Rotterdam (which were free ports) in the EU statistics. He had found the information about the Convention and the Constitution really scary and would encourage any action which might halt those developments.

Lord Pearson, asked by Sir Michael Spicer to clarify whether Rotterdam was included in the figures, said that statistically it was a very dense area. It could be said that the proportion of trade with the EU was below 9%, but there was a mole in the Bank of England who put it as low as 7%, bearing in mind the Rotterdam/Antwerp effect and the investment that came to this country through the Netherlands for tax reasons and counted as EU trade. For public impact he would say less than 10% - though a good case could be made to get it down to 7%.

There were many different groups each expressing their own view as to the most important message against the Euro. Some organisations would be trying to reach the public at large and it would be important to keep the strategy under review up to the point when the referendum was called. There should be no complacency about the messages which had been successful to date, and it would be vital to use research and analysis to find the right strategy, the right target voters and the right messages.

Sir Michael Spicer then invited the two speakers to comment on the questions raised.

The variety and quality of questions and interventions had shown that despite their very different backgrounds and perspectives all present were trying to retain people’s ability to govern themselves. Policies and politicians came and went and they could be dismissed; mistakes could be corrected under a good political system. The system on offer would take away the capacity for change and that was what he was fighting for in the Convention on the Future of Europe, allied to many groups whose visions of society differed greatly from his but they all wanted to retain people’s ability to choose between them. He saw this as the most important duty of a politician. They were working on an alternative which they called the Europe of Democracies to try to encapsulate the idea that they believed in an association of self-governing states of Europe which were democratic and which came together for common purposes because there were issues which must be co-ordinated, discussed and acted on together. There were issues on which the individual states could not act alone, but it was important that the will for such an association came from below and from the desire of the national Parliaments. He agreed that it was essential to do this on an internationalist basis and to seek other allies so that no one could ever accuse them of being Little Englanders, which he considered a ridiculous charge: virtually the whole world outside Europe spoke English because Britain was a global power, internationalist and outward-looking. It was of great benefit for the small states of Europe, particularly the applicant states, to know that they were not alone in seeking self-government and the powers of their own democracies.

As he had predicted there seemed to be a pretty wide consensus of opposition to the activities of the Convention and to the type of constitution likely to emerge from it. He had also noticed a strong feeling that the process of educating the public needed to begin soon and that an important part of that process would be to try to press for a commitment that there should be a referendum of the British people before any draft Constitution which emerged was approved. A wide range of views had been expressed as to what extent Congress should be putting forward positive alternatives to the ideas in the draft Constitution: some felt that some positive alternative was required while others felt that the only solution was to get out of the whole enterprise. He would like to see more thought going into positive alternatives but he considered it important for Congress to move forward in a collective way that ensured the widest possible support amongst all members and constituent groups.

He spoke about how Congress should take forward the propositions put up by Lionel Bell and others.

First, he reminded people that the Congress had come together to campaign against the single currency, but it had decided at the last Congress to move on into constitutional matters, which had been discussed formally for the first time at this meeting. He suggested that a working party should be set up to look at the propositions in detail, the specifics and the policy implications, and bring them forward to the next Congress. This was currently planned for Friday 16th May 2003, when consideration could be given to whether there was sufficient consensus to proceed, even perhaps to form an alternative Convention.

The Congress did not have unlimited resources for research but people with expert knowledge or something to contribute to discussions on constitutional issues would be invited to volunteer themselves (and he had already volunteered Ivan Lawrence). He asked anyone who wanted to join to tell Margaret Bottomley.

He congratulated the platform speakers on their vision and passion. Following the alternative Convention and the Europe of Democracies, he wanted to mention the magic words "Free Trade", which had not been mentioned, but which had been the reason for which most people thought Britain had joined the EEC. It was possible within the WTO rules to have a relationship on an inter-governmental basis of free trade in both goods and commercial services, and he hoped that the Congress would include that issue in its future deliberations.

She brought warm wishes from Denmark and from the Danish People’s Party. Their Party Chairman had been unable to attend because she had been drawn into budget negotiations in Denmark.

On 13th September the Danish newspapers had carried an important story: a team of scientists from the University of Zurich had discovered that the €1 coin and the €2 coin contained 300 times the amount of nickel permitted under EU rules. As nickel could produce uncomfortable rashes they had decided to run a campaign to warn the population about the nickel, and had produced plastic gloves. The campaign had been very effective; they had run advertisements in the national press and offered people free gloves. Out of a population of 5 million they had received a response of 20,000 within the first fourteen days. They had also had a campaign poster made into a doormat for Sir Michael Spicer.

Thanking Yvette Espersen, Sir Michael Spicer commented that he was not surprised the Danish People’s Party had moved from 7th to 3rd place in the national ratings.

Closing the Congress, he said that he thought it had been a very interesting morning. For the first time there had been front-running Labour politicians involved; there had also been many trade unionists present. The Congress was now genuinely multi-party.

He thanked the speakers, Margaret Bottomley and Annabel Lloyd, and reminded people that the next Congress for Democracy would be on Friday, 16th May 2003.