Sir Michael Spicer MP welcomed people to the Congress, apologising for the late start and expressing the hope that more people would arrive as travel difficulties eased. He also passed on apologies from Austin Mitchell MP who had been prevented from attending by a personal crisis and whose chairmanship of part of the Congress would be much missed.

He said that the Congress could not be more timely as the Convention on the Future of Europe, which he expected to be discussed later with some vigour, was meeting that morning in Brussels; moreover the Government would be announcing its decision on the Euro on 9th June.

He then introduced Nigel Smith, Chairman of the No Campaign, and a world expert on referendums; he had been chairman of the successful Yes campaign in the referendum in Scotland. He would speak on the future of the Euro campaign and how his organisation was addressing it.

Nigel Smith said that he had been asked to prepare for a referendum in the current Parliament but, in his view, there could be no referendum before the end of the Parliament.

He had been trying to build a coalition, which was difficult without the immediate prospect of battle, but he had been talking to people from different political parties and from many institutions in society and had been surprised by the range of issues which would motivate people to make their decision in a referendum.

Public opinion had been split roughly 2-1 against the Euro for some years, and opinion was divided across all the major institutions: business, trade unions, the governing party and even the Cabinet.

A characteristic of referendums was that about half of those voting were already totally committed to one side or the other; it was the other half on whom the campaign would concentrate. He did not think the Government would ever convince the electorate on the issue of sharing control of the currency, but he was aware that the Government would try to portray those opposed to the Euro as pessimists looking to the past.

He thought that the Electoral Commissioner would ensure that the preamble, the question and the conduct of the referendum would be fair, but he was concerned about the Government’s activities during the referendum period, which could last six months but would only be controlled during the last month. He feared that government time and resources might be used in the period before the final month of the campaign and planned to take legal action to define that area. He was also concerned about broadcasting balance, which should be on a 50/50 basis.

Turning to the assessment of the five tests, he expected that the Government would give a conditional negative, keeping open the option for a referendum in the current Parliament. In order to win a referendum the Government would have to convert opinion, for which they needed time. When voters realised that the result of the referendum would be binding on the Government and that people they respected were on both sides of the argument he expected them to become more cautious and to question the need to change the status quo. He also believed that, despite the media view that the voters would follow the Prime Minister’s leadership, in referendums political leadership was not all-important.

Occasionally, late in the life of a government, the voters used a referendum to give that government a "bloody nose", a possibility which made it even less likely that there would be a referendum in the current Parliament. The Government was in a fix: they could not campaign for the Euro because the Chancellor would not let them, but if they did not campaign the polls would not move. Downing Street wanted to campaign but not to hold a referendum.

Finally, he said that every referendum was conditional on the political context in which it took place. The Convention was now looming large and he expected that the debate about the Convention would be extremely important to the Euro referendum, which he expected to be some way off.

Thanking Nigel Smith, Sir Michael asked whether he thought that the Campaign machinery could switch to fighting for a referendum on the Convention if it became necessary.

Nigel Smith replied that it would be possible technically but he wondered whether it would be politically wise; the great attraction of a referendum was that the politics were defined in the issue, allowing those who disagreed on many other points to come together in a single campaign. He would need to wait to hear the Government’s announcement on the Euro before he could advise but he was inclined to be cautious.

He asked on what basis the No Campaign was described as the official campaign because, if it were, those campaigning to leave the EU would be subordinate to the Campaign, which would have other political and financial implications.

Nigel Smith replied that the designation of the No and Yes campaigns belonged to the Electoral Commission. The law did not stop anybody campaigning for or against the issue, but the Act required people to campaign for one of the outcomes on the ballot paper. The Electoral Commission would choose the official campaign on the balance of the arguments put to them. No-one was prevented from campaigning: in fact there was a huge loophole in the law on spending under which there was no control over the number of organisations spending their maximum amount on the No side. He did not think the Campaign had any legitimacy beyond the fact that people either adhered to it or did not.

He was pleased that Nigel Smith recognised that there was not going to be a referendum on the Euro before the next election. There was only one test which would prompt a referendum on the Euro (a massive lead in the opinion polls in favour of the Euro) and he did not expect that in his lifetime. But there would not be a referendum on the Constitution either, and he suggested that Congress and the No Campaign should perhaps be addressing the possibility of a private referendum and the problems associated with a universal postal vote. The majority of the public were not interested in the Constitution, but he argued that a private referendum would enhance the debate and make people pay attention to the issues. He felt that Congress should be involved in the campaign for a private referendum because it was the only way to prevent the European Constitution being pushed through Parliament.

Nigel Smith replied that private referendums carried some risks, but they had also been very successful, quoting as examples the recent referendum in Gibraltar and a referendum by post held by Strathclyde Council on the privatisation of water, in which 90% had voted against, killing the issue. But if the public could not be focused enough to return their ballot papers (only 30% of ballot papers had been returned in the private referendum in Scotland on Section 28) the risks were great.

Referring to John Boyd’s remarks, he said that although those with fixed ideas on whether Britain should remain in or out of the EU were not going to drop them, they had all agreed that during a referendum campaign they would concentrate on the issue before them - whether or not Britain abandoned the pound. There was no dispute that organisations would unite around that proposition.

He did not think Congress should be defeatist about a referendum on the Constitution. When the Convention’s proposals were put before Parliament in a Bill there was, he felt, a very good chance that the House of Lords would be able to carry an amendment to give the people of Britain an opportunity of saying what they thought through a referendum. He argued that it would be very difficult for the Liberal Democrats to refuse a referendum and with their support, and that of the cross-benches and the Conservative Party, it would be possible to carry an amendment in the House of Lords. He argued that it would be difficult for the House of Commons to refuse because that would result in a situation where the unelected House was encouraging democracy while the elected House was denying it. He warned that Congress should be very careful about spending money on a private referendum; the money could be better used to educate people about events in the EU and how they affected the British public and their historical institutions.

He argued that any idea that personalities would not be key to the referendum campaign was wrong: in the 1975 referendum the result was influenced because it was clear that the great and the good were on one side and the nut-cases, as portrayed, were on the other. It was quite clear to him that Mr Blair would portray the Campaign as a bunch of dinosaurs, backward-looking little Englanders. It was therefore vitally important that the Campaign had the right personalities across the spectrum and that the campaign was very positive, looking to the future and showing Britain as a global actor and a global trader with the freedom of individuals determined in this country.

The Daily Mail had announced that day that it would hold a national referendum regardless of the Government. He had read recently that the Campaign was planning to cut staff after the announcement on the Euro and he hoped that Nigel Smith would confirm that that was not the case but that, having won the battle so far, they would recruit staff and spend more money to fight the real issue, the Constitution because, if it were adopted the Euro would come anyway. He had started an organisation called A Few the previous autumn to fund and organise a referendum (www.afew.org.uk). He felt it had been overtaken by events because there had recently been calls for a referendum in the Sunday Telegraph and The Spectator. He urged all organisations on the No side to support the Daily Mail’s referendum either to give it legitimacy or to force the Government into holding one. He personally preferred the idea of a private referendum because it would be fair and equally funded.

Nigel Smith replied that he could give no assurance about the future of the No Campaign as no decision would be taken until after the June assessment. He had no problem with a referendum on the Convention; one of the areas where direct democracy was most used was on constitutional matters. He was interested that a majority of countries which were members of the Convention had agreed to have a referendum on it, though not all were constitutionally obliged to do so. He felt the tide was going in favour of a referendum and, as a fan of direct democracy, he would support it.

He commented that a British Euro referendum, which took place after Parliament had ratified the new Constitution for the EU would be much more difficult to fight and to win than the Euro referendum which took place before then.

Quoting as an example the recent outbreak of foot and mouth disease and the failure of the Government, civil servants and the press to refer to the lessons learned from the outbreak in 1967-8, he asked whether the Campaign had sought to learn all the lessons from the 1975 referendum and whether they had noted the publications which had followed. He particularly mentioned one written by the triumphant Yes side which had exposed very fully how the wool had been pulled over the eyes of the British electorate.

Nigel Smith replied that the total absorption of the other side in the lessons of 1975 had greatly helped the No Campaign. British democracy, the level of education and the means of communication had all changed so much that 1975 could not be repeated in the way expected by the opposition and it suited his campaign that they should focus so much on Britain’s single national referendum and not on referendums in other western democracies. He had written a paper on 1975, analysing the lessons.

He said that he was trying to organise a "No to the Euro" campaign in his local area, Walsall, combining forces with other campaigners, two Conservatives, one Liberal Democrat and possibly a Labour local councillor. He asked whether the No Campaign would give support to such groups when the referendum campaign started.

In reply Nigel Smith reminded Congress that one way of winning a referendum was to change the issue, and the other side would very much like to introduce a third option: that the debate about the Euro was really a debate about leaving the EU. He predicted that they would go out of their way to goad those who had a legitimate political opinion that Britain should leave the EU. That was an issue which had to be tackled during the 5 or 6 months of the referendum campaign because the third option had to be taken out of the referendum. The problem was to find a way to harness the energies of those committed to leaving Europe in a genuine and honest way that stood the heat of the studio. The No Campaign had discussed with Lord Stoddart and others the formation of another alliance where individuals would not be forced to give an assurance that they would say Yes to Europe, but could easily explain in the studio that this was what they believed but the issue at stake was the Euro. They were trying to find a way of accommodating these fundamental political differences amongst the No campaigners.

Cross-party campaigning was not enough. The other side would drive the agenda that the No campaigners were all "outers", all over 60, all backward-looking and all pessimists. Moreover, they wanted to claim that if the country voted No to the Euro it would be leaving Europe five years down the line. While that suited some, he knew that the median group on the No side was pretty unenthusiastic about Europe but they were too scared to leave. If that element felt that the campaign was not really about the Euro but about a Trojan horse for leaving Europe, then a slice of them would desert the cause, as had happened in 1992 in the French referendum on Maastricht. His problem, and that of the coalition, was to find a way of dealing with the third option. While stressing that he did not challenge the motives of those who wanted to leave the EU, he wanted to find an honest way of allowing them not to have to give positive reassurance about something they did not believe in but which would enable them in a studio to concentrate on the issue at stake.

His main concern was that businessmen were poor speakers. They were good at running businesses but not at putting their point of view across to the broader public. Politicians were very good at this, but they were bound to some extent by party politics. He wondered how, in a referendum campaign, all the elements would be galvanised together so that the good speakers put across the points to convince the different elements of the population at large.

Nigel Smith agreed that this was the challenge of every referendum. Internally the politics were pretty big and there had to be much confidence and trust between the different groups in the No Campaign. He argued strongly for an integrated media centre in order to minimise problems in countering the image the other side wanted to impose on them. He warned that it would not be easy.

The Federation’s policy was clear-cut: it was opposed to the introduction of the Euro. He claimed that Britain in Europe and senior Labour politicians were continually putting out misinformation, facts and figures which did not bear scrutiny and he suggested that the No Campaign countered those facts more vigorously instead of scaling down.

Nigel Smith said that he had until very recently done much to introduce facts into the debate. However, in the last 2-3 weeks the No Campaign had deliberately stood back because they wanted the public to realise that the tests had not been passed. It had been shown in the media that the Government was split on the way to proceed and that the five tests were only partially met. The issue of black propaganda and misinformation was rife throughout referendum campaigns; they had to decide where to pitch their honest campaign but he warned that some of the stuff coming from the other side would be pretty brutal.

He suggested that the Church of England should be asked to hold a referendum on the Constitution, arguing that such a referendum would be part-state and part-private. It was within the remit of the Church of England, through the General Synod, to agree the wording of the question. Both state and parish were part of the realm; the issues were the coins of the realm and the Constitution and the Queen was therefore involved. He suggested that Congress should submit a petition to the Queen to exercise her Royal Prerogative and to exercise her constitutional position.

He recognised the difficulty in trying to reconcile the slightly different emphases of the groups involved and that people were nervous of leaving the EU but he suggested that they took this view because they were ill-informed on European issues. In the press the Convention on the Future of Europe was only discussed in terms of European expansion; he had seen no reference to the clause about having to accept the Euro. He felt it important to let the British public know by the most effective means that the Convention dealt with wider issues than the expansion of the EU to 25 states; there were great implications regarding the Euro, foreign policy, defence etc.

He referred to the suggestion, to which he was totally opposed, that the Church of England should conduct a referendum in the Parochial Church Council authorities. The Church of England was promoting regionalisation and trying to convince local people that they had a regional identity.

He felt it important to put across to the British people the issues involved in adopting the Euro. It would involve surrendering the rights to set interest rates and to levy taxation, and becoming a subsidiary of the European Central Bank. He was concerned that people would not understand if the referendum campaign went into detail but they had to be told it was not just about their holiday money.

He entirely accepted Nigel Smith’s point that the opposition must not be allowed to confuse the issue in a radio interview by suggesting that the real object was to leave the EU. However, during the referendum campaign there would be constituency campaigns in which active members of organisations like the Democracy Movement and CIB etc would co-operate, and they were likely to agree amongst themselves that there should only be one constituency campaign.

Nigel Smith said that the problem was not the issue of leaving Europe, but that he wanted the campaign to give a positive reassurance about Europe. It was very unreasonable to ask those who had spent a lifetime campaigning against Europe to give that assurance. The coalition would include reluctant Europeans and positive pro-Europeans who did not want the Euro. His problem was to devise a means of reassuring them without putting those who wanted to leave the EU in an awkward position.

She asked what the No Campaign actually stood for, to which Nigel Smith replied, "Europe Yes, Euro No".

He asked how successful the No Campaign was in recruiting the young.

Nigel Smith said that the young were one of the electoral groups who were quite anti-Euro but they were also quite volatile. They were important both for their votes and in changing the character of the campaign. He hoped that Zac Goldsmith, a relatively young man, would speak on their behalf in the campaign, and also Caroline Lucas of the Greens. Both would help to change the public’s perception of the campaign.

He asked whether Nigel Smith thought that at the next general election Mr Blair might include in the Labour manifesto a proposal to seek the agreement of Parliament to join the Euro providing the economic conditions were right, thereby aborting the need to have a referendum at all if a Labour Government were returned to power. He asked whether Nigel Smith thought that it was with that in mind that those in favour of the Euro wanted to keep it permanently under review.

Nigel Smith reminded people that the Government was not constitutionally bound to have a referendum and could adopt that policy but there would be a political price: the promise of a referendum removed the issue from a general election, as had been very evident in Scotland over the Scottish Parliament.

Currently the Government could not make a serious case for joining the Euro. Those in favour of joining wanted more flexible five tests. They wanted to be able to campaign, for Tony Blair to make really good speeches about the Euro. They were looking for a freedom until the General Election to campaign, not to have a referendum, but to pre-position public opinion, and then to call a referendum within six months of the General Election. He thought it would be difficult because the public would want to discuss other issues, such as schools.

Sir Michael Spicer MP thanked Nigel Smith and Congress broke for coffee.

Following the break, the Sir Michael Spicer welcomed to the platform Roger Pincham, Liberal Democrat and a member of the Congress for Democracy’s Agenda Committee.

He then introduced the Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford, Opposition Spokesman on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the House of Lords.

Lord Howell said that in a few weeks a draft new constitution for the EU would be presented to the Council of Ministers. Although the draft constitution was being presented to the British people by the Government as a mere revision of club rules, it would replace all previous EU and EC treaties and was likely to be a second Treaty of Rome, even more significant than the first. It would lead to the most far-reaching piece of EU legislation, giving the EU institutions a new source of legitimacy above the nation states and for the first time Britons would be subordinate to a written constitutional document.

Although the Government maintained that the proposals were still in draft form and had yet to be decided, there was evidence that a new EU Constitution, together with the proposal for a new President of the EU and for strengthening the central institutions of the Union, was already Government policy. The Government claimed that the proposed Constitution would clarify the division of responsibilities, halt the creeping power of Brussels and would not encroach upon foreign and security policy, and yet the draft included the following points:

• A demand that a whole range of powers (including foreign policy, security policy, transport, social policy and energy) be shared between the EU institutions and the member states;
  
• A statement that the Union shall co-ordinate economic policies;
  
• A reduction in the role of national parliaments and only a condescending review by the Commission of any objection to EU intrusion in any area;
  
• A single "pillar" for everything including justice, home affairs, foreign and defence policy, which would all be swept under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice;
  
• A new Euro-minister of Foreign Affairs and a commitment to a single legal personality for the EU, giving it a place on international bodies, including the UN;
  
• An EU Justice and Interior Ministry and an EU Attorney General, together with the imposition of Community laws.

He argued that the Prime Minister should indicate now that he would be prepared to use his veto if the Constitution in its present form were backed by the Council of Ministers in June and passed to the IGC in the autumn. Failing that, the Prime Minister should agree to hold a referendum on the Constitution, which was more important and far-reaching than the Treaties of Amsterdam or Nice and on which ten other EU member states were holding referendums.

He saw the Constitution as part of a plan to make the EU a counterweight to the USA, inspired by anti-American feeling; there would be no American alliance with an "Old Europe" dominated by France.

The Constitution reasserted centralised European thinking and attempted to fix the relationship between nations. The British constitution had always been in a constant state of development, which had meant Britain was able to adapt quickly to a changing world. Britons had always been good Europeans and wanted to see democracy and accountability for EU laws.

Britain needed open markets, international co-operation on defence, and partnerships with the USA, her European neighbours and her Commonwealth colleagues. Britain should have a place at the table in the new enlarged Europe but there must be scope for her ideas and initiatives, together with those of the smaller and newer states, to be heard. In order to work, the EU of the future should be a Europe of democracies, a democratic Europe of states, not the bureaucratic, rigid European construct envisaged by the Convention.

He asked whether Lord Howell felt that an elected Government, only in power for one Parliament, had the authority to pass power, given to them by the electorate, to another body.

Lord Howell replied the he did not feel they should, but it was possible for the present Government with their enormous majority in the House of Commons to assert the primacy of Parliament even to the point of giving away its own powers. Should Parliament be presented with a colossal Bill abolishing all the previous European Union treaties and replacing them with this Constitution, he believed that the Lords would seek to insert a clause requiring that there should be a referendum before ratification. There might be a majority for such a clause in the House of Lords, which would lead to lengthy exchanges with the House of Commons and would delay the legislation for some time. It would not stop it, but the delay would have a dramatic effect on the attempted schedule of the new Treaty of Rome.

Lord Howell had said that the plan was to create the United States of Europe as a counter-weight to the United States of America. Until now the USA had been pushing Britain further into Europe. Were they going to stop persuading the UK that it should get into Europe and agree that Europe was a lost cause, dangerous to the USA and to the world?

Lord Howell replied that he thought the USA’s view had changed. He thought that the divisions over the Iraq war had brought home to the American policy establishment that the simple idea of a United States of Europe would not work. The message had got through to Washington that they had made a terrible mistake when five years ago the State Department had decided that relations with Germany were more important than those with London and had told Britain that she would be marginalised if she did not become fully involved in the European political project. Washington was looking for support and allies in the new international network. Some were saying that Europe was a write-off, which he thought was wrong, as was the idea that America was going to re-build bridges with the old-style centralised European Union, with an agenda laid down by Paris and Berlin. There was a new European consortium with which they would like to do business. The way they were beginning to involve Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States was extremely interesting. He felt the message was getting through, not just to the current Administration, but to American thinkers generally, that the future world was not one in which everyone sensible in this region should all join in an integrated superpower or superstate.

He made the point that amongst the Liberal Democrat peers were two of considerable influence who were much closer to Congress’s point of view. One was Lord Dahrendorf, who, above all, saw European integration as a denial of democracy. He urged those in the Lords to listen to Lord Dahrendorf whose argument, he felt, was very powerful amongst Liberal Democrats generally. It was Paddy Ashdown who had extracted the promise before the 1997 election that there would be a referendum on the Euro.

He asked Lord Howell whether he did not accept that the sort of Europe he would like to see was not and never would be on offer; there was no possibility of assembling unanimity amongst the existing EU, let alone the expanded EU, to make the sort of changes he wanted.

Lord Howell agreed that it had never been on offer and might not be offered now but he felt it wrong not to realise that all sorts of opportunities were opening up for a bold Britain whose people could show themselves to be good Europeans. The Europe they wanted to be with was not the one headed in the direction of old-fashioned, centralised, inward-looking, protective, high-tax, over-regulated integration. He believed that a more flexible and more effective Europe was attainable because the world had changed: the EU was out of date, the UN was out of date and NATO had had to re-think itself.

He asked whether it was Conservative Party policy to go for a referendum on the Constitution.

Lord Howell confirmed that it was and, having stated the policy, the Party now had to make the case for it. To those in the room it might be obvious but in the wider world people were largely ignorant. The media were just waking up to the issue, which had hitherto been belittled by the Government spin machine. The Conservatives had to make the case that there should be a referendum before ratification of a Treaty bringing a constitutional imposition into the British system.

Sir Michael thanked Lord Howell.

He reminded Congress that at the Eighth Congress it had been agreed to set up a Working Party to consider the proposals for an EU Constitution to be put forward by the Convention on the Future of Europe. He thanked the members of the Working Party: Martin Howe QC (Chairman), Lionel Bell, Eric Deakins, Sir Ivan Lawrence and Russell Walters, and introduced Martin Howe to present the Report of the Working Party.

Sir Michael presented apologies from David Heathcote-Amory MP, who was that morning in Brussels at a meeting of the Convention.

He introduced the Working Party’s report on the Convention and the draft Constitution, initially recalling the purpose of the Convention on the Future of Europe. This had been established by the summit meeting at Laeken in December 2001 at which it had been recognised that the European Union needed to become "more democratic, more transparent and more efficient". The Convention had been given the task of considering the key issues arising for the Union's future development and identifying the various possible responses; in response, the Convention had drafted a complete new Constitution for the European Union.

The Convention operated according to undemocratic procedures, reflecting the top-down nature of the European Union. The small Praesidium Committee formulated and published draft treaty Articles without prior consultation with the Convention. The Convention was due to finish drafting the Constitutional Treaty in time for submission to the summit meeting at Thessaloniki on 20 and 21 June, though it was possible that it might be delayed until July. He commented that although it had been said that the purpose of the Treaty of Nice was to pave the way for the enlargement of the European Union to 25 member states, it was now said that that Treaty, which had hardly come into force, was inadequate and that a new Constitution was necessary.

The Convention’s Draft Treaty was called a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – an accurate title because although it was a Treaty, once in force it would establish a Constitution, a legal document from which legal powers were drawn and which conferred directly powers to act on different institutions. Article 1 stated that this Constitution established the Union; one possible title was the United States of Europe, which he expected to be omitted, together with references to federal powers.

Article 9(1) stated that "The Constitution and the law adopted by the Union Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it by the Constitution shall have primacy over the laws of the member states." It was clear that the current draft aimed to supplant the member states and their own constitutions as the supreme source of legal authority, thereby destroying the ultimate sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament.

The Constitution gave the Union exclusive competence in relation to free movement of persons, goods, services and capital in the internal market, on competition rules, customs union and common commercial policy, and fisheries, but also a new competence in the conclusion of international agreements where they affected a Union act. He commented that if the Constitution as currently drafted were adopted, future agreements to which Britain was a party would be concluded by the European Union in its own name, on behalf of this country.

The Constitution also conferred on the Union a vast range of "shared" competences, but in this instance "shared" meant only to the extent that the Union had not exercised its competence. He foresaw that the competence of the member states would simply be taken away in areas relating to the internal market, judicial
co-operation, agriculture, transport, energy, social policy, environment, public health and consumer protection. Moreover, in exercising what little powers remained to them the member states would have a duty of "loyal co-operation" towards the Union.

The European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights would be given legal force under the Constitution as drafted. The Constitution also proposed that there should be a permanent President of the European Council, assisted by a Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would report to the Council of Ministers and also be a member of the Commission. The Constitution also made provision for flexibility – to expand powers even further, giving the Council, with the assent of the European Parliament, power to "take appropriate measures", representing a transfer of powers from national parliaments and national electorates to a small group of government ministers able to enact measures without external review.

The Constitution also contained a lengthy chapter on criminal and civil justice, which contained provisions for the creation of the European Public Prosecutor. He foresaw that ultimately this might lead to a framework for minimum and maximum sentences and the harmonisation of civil and criminal court procedure, and a new concept "the free movement of judgements".

The final aspect which the Working Party looked at was the question of what would happen if Britain refused to ratify the Treaty. The legal position was quite clear: in order to replace the existing Treaties of Rome and Maastricht the unanimous ratification of all existing members was required, as was the unanimous ratification and assent of all the new member states once the accession treaties had come in. Any member state had the power to block the adoption of the new Constitution for the whole of Europe. Refusal to ratify the Constitution would not, despite the Government’s attempts to persuade people to the contrary, lead to any member state automatically leaving the European Union. One option might be to continue with the status quo, remaining within the EU under the existing treaties; another might be to negotiate terms on which this country could remain related to the EU and its internal market while allowing an inner core to go ahead and adopt a Constitution. In the Constitution as presently drafted there was also a clause giving a member state an unfettered right to give notice as a result of which after two years it would cease to be a member of the European Union.

The Working Party had concluded that the proposed Constitution undoubtedly constituted a major further transfer of powers to the European Union and recommended that Congress should adopt the position that it would take all steps open to it to explain and publicise the true nature and effects of the constitutional treaty and press for a referendum on its ratification. On behalf of himself and his colleagues in the Working Party he formally proposed the resolution before Congress.

Thanking Martin Howe, Sir Michael Spicer opened the debate, encouraging Congress to consider the draft Resolution and the possibility that Congress might publish as a substantive document the report from the Working Party on Constitutional Developments in the European Union.

He proposed an amendment to the Resolution, adding at the end the following words:

"If Parliament fails to provide a referendum then a privately-funded referendum of the whole British electorate should be held, possibly by a postal vote."

He endorsed Lord Howell’s view that it was imperative to hit the right tone when campaigning for a referendum on the Constitution. People had to appreciate that it was a coalition-building exercise and that, in order to win over large numbers of Labour and LibDem MPs and voters to the demand for a referendum before ratification of the Constitution, it would be necessary to focus on the theme of democracy rather than nationalism. The coalition would have to include people who believed in an EU state but accepted that there had to be a referendum before the Constitution was ratified.

He said that it had been suggested that the fairly automatic alternative for a country that was unable to ratify the Constitution (and if 10 countries were holding referendums that probability did exist) would be a straightforward exit into some form of European Economic Association, a free trade arrangement without the sovereignty and other implications of the full European Union. He felt that this might be why the Government was determined not to have a referendum on the issue. Such a referendum could be represented on one side as offering the opportunity to keep sterling, and having a free trade arrangement with the EU but not going any further down the path to integration. The Government might very well suspect that they might lose a referendum conducted with that background. Lionel Bell felt that, even if his suggestion were quite inaccurate, it might prove useful in debate to accuse the Government of taking that line, but it depended on the consequences of non-ratification.

He represented the Estonian Research Centre for a Free Europe, one of whose main goals was active participation in the debate about the future of Europe and in a referendum campaign on EU accession to be held on 14th September. His organisation wanted a free Estonia in a free Europe, but Estonia faced the same problems as Britain. The citizens feared that national sovereignty would be lost again and the accession treaty was in deep contradiction to the Estonian Constitution. Businessmen were worried because the new economic environment in the European Union would be much worse than it now was; Estonia had the sixth freest economy in the world, which would fall apart in the European Union. But, at the same time, there was fear of the consequences of saying No to EU Accession because Estonia was a small country in need of co-operation and concrete alternatives to the European Union.

Lord Howell had touched on transatlantic co-operation, which he believed was also the way forward for Estonia. He proposed to Congress that Great Britain should take the initiative for closer co-operation between European and American nations with the aim of creating a North Atlantic trade area - NATA - where EU, NAFTA and EFTA countries should agree on a free trade agreement and should afterwards work together in many other fields on the basis of inter-governmental co-operation, multilateral systems and mutual respect for the creation of a North Atlantic security and economic area. Both Europe and the US needed to co-operate to understand and counteract terrorism. Britain could leave the European Union but Estonia currently had little alternative to joining. He also proposed that Britain and Estonia should work more closely together for a more democratic and free Europe.

Sir Michael asked whether it was Professor Raig’s view that Estonia would vote against the Convention in a referendum. Professor Raig said that the situation in the accession referendum was nearly 50-50: the No vote was still quite weak but voters were very much afraid of the new European Union. He felt the referendum was winnable with help.

Sir Michael made it clear that once Estonia had accepted accession a No vote would be a veto on the carrying out of the Convention arrangements.

He had been to Estonia the previous week and had been extremely impressed by the organisation that Professor Raig was building there. He commented that if Estonia with a population of 1,400,000 could vote No it could not be argued that the United Kingdom was too small to stay out of the clutches of Brussels. Estonia would be voting after the Convention had been finalised and the Estonian people would therefore know that they were voting for one thing but would get another. However, the Poles and those voting before 20th September would not know that, and he hoped they would be quite annoyed when they discovered what they had done.

He also commented that the clarity of Giscard’s language could help to win any referendum on the Constitution because people were waking up to the seriousness of the situation. The other side would then point out that it contained nothing new. He warned campaigners to be on their guard against that argument and make the point that it was entirely unacceptable.

Speaking as a good Conservative he felt he should be honest and realise that the problems went back to the 1972 Act, from which he quoted extracts. The Conservatives had also brought in the Single European Act, which gave all Britain’s commerce and industry to the qualified majority vote in Brussels, and then they gave away all the agriculture, fisheries and environment. At that point Conservative guilt should stop because the Labour Government had added the Social Chapter and had added Amsterdam and Nice and now proposed this. He hoped that the Conservative Party would join with those who had wanted to get out of the EU for some years and unite in fighting the new Treaty. He prayed that the terms of the Treaty would be bad enough to encourage the Liberal Democrats and others in the House of Lords to vote for a referendum of the British people.

His organisation was entirely in favour of withdrawal from the EU. He congratulated the Working Party on producing an extremely valuable document and hoped that people would give it a wide circulation by reproducing it in their various publications.

He proposed the following amendment to the Resolution:

in the last line, after "for" insert "the United Kingdom Parliament to reject the Constitutional Treaty and failing this to call for".

He supported the Resolution but it was the view of the Anti-Common Market League that the first line of defence should be to call for Parliament to reject it. He argued that the House of Lords had the possibility of rejecting it and using their delaying powers, and then, if they could not get the House of Commons to agree, to insert the referendum procedure. He thought the referendum procedure should be the last resort because, he argued, people should be demanding that their own Members of Parliament should recognise what was proposed by this particular Treaty. They would be failing in their duty as constituents if they did not emphasise that.

He had served for 18 years on the House of Commons Select Committee on European Legislation. One of the difficulties of the British Constitution was to explain complicated matters to constituents, even those who would be really upset if they understood what was afoot. All the treaties, effectively now the written constitution of the United Kingdom by Act of Parliament, had been enacted by Government prerogative by negotiation on a non-Parliamentary basis. In the Convention in Brussels, where the Secretary of State for Wales represented Her Majesty’s Government, they had tried to mix it up. He argued that the treaties could be divided into two: the basic treaties relating to the powers of the Government on taxation, legislation and adjudication but then execution and prerogative was added in whole fields (the so-called pillars) by the Treaty of Maastricht. That was done by prerogative power and the prerogative power of government in the Council of Ministers, outside the control or even the scrutiny of Parliament because it was all fixed and the results reported. In treaties after Maastricht Britain was losing the prerogatives of the Crown (as exercised by the Government). He thought the public might understand that "without further enactment" meant a by-pass had been created round Parliament, the Crown, the electorate, general elections and the British constitution insofar as it existed.

At the beginning of the debates in 1972 it had been said that the position of the Crown was not affected, but the Crown represented the people in a democratic state. If the Convention went through the peoples of Europe would be even more swallowed up in a new Roman-like imperium, currently being forged in Brussels, which was legislative, executive, prerogative and judicial. That was the picture he wanted to try to put across.

He asked what happened to Resolutions passed by Congress.

In reply Sir Michael Spicer said that Congress had always taken the view that it was not a campaigning organisation, but a meeting of the spectrum of campaigning organisations, particularly when focusing on the Euro. The purpose of resolutions was to establish a common position on certain issues specifically related in the past to democracy and to maintaining democracy and to the need for referendums when democracy was threatened. Resolutions then passed back to the campaigning organisations. If Congress decided that it wished to press for a referendum and for Parliamentary approval or disapproval of the Treaty suggested by the Convention, then it would be passed back to the campaigning organisations giving support to what they were doing. Idris Francis felt that Congress should give backing to the Daily Mail.

He pointed out that the Daily Mail had said that it would hold a referendum and the only circumstances under which he imagined it would fail to do so would be if the Prime Minister were shamed into holding one. Congress therefore had to ensure that it was successful, and he suggested that every organisation represented there should contact the Daily Mail immediately to offer support, encouragement, manpower and whatever resources available.

He commented that the wording of the first sentence of the resolution passed at the Fifth Congress was unfortunate in that it read like an instruction. He also urged that the resolution before the Ninth Congress should include at the end words to the effect that once Britain re-established itself as a free country a constitutional convention should be held to prevent for all time the subversion of the British constitution.

She maintained that people in the country were still solidly against the Euro because of the campaigning at the grass roots, not because of any efforts by big business. In order to win the referendum the campaign organisers were going to have to take into account the grass roots who would do the leg work. They were already working hard and would resent being described as nationalistic, little Englanders and old fuddy-duddies. She quoted examples: in Devon a petition to the Queen, in Essex postcards to send to the Queen, videos about the five treaties and the European Convention. People at the grass roots were not prepared to accept that nothing could be done if the Government would not permit a referendum.

She argued that Britain had let down the smaller countries, who had welcomed her into the EC because they thought her people would stand up for democracy, but instead they had signed away their own. All those opposed, including Tory MPs, had to come out and tell the people, stand together and say No. As they could not win a vote in the Commons they would have to do it out with the people. Then Estonia could stand up and say No, we have a partner, we’re not going down this road. She urged people to forget the silly idea "In Europe, not run by Europe". Britain was run by Europe.

Someone (no name given) asked Martin Howe what options were open to Britain if she decided not to have the Convention. He understood that the reason the Constitution was written in such strong language was that it was expected to be watered down; Mr Blair would have the words "federal" and "constitution" removed. Brussels would obviously never take No for an answer, so what was their Plan B?

He thought that Plan B was probably to make those member states who said No the first time vote again until they came up with the right answer, a plan, coupled with threats of 20% unemployment if you say no, which did seem to be effective. Although it had worked in two previous instances he did not think it would be effective in Britain which was big enough not to be intimidated. The position with the applicant countries was that once they had joined, signed up to the existing treaties they had a veto and could stop the Constitution altogether. But he suspected that Brussels might be trying to get the new constitutional treaty into force before accession by the new states (an ambitious timetable) and therefore face the applicant countries with the alternatives of not joining or joining and signing up to the Constitution.

He seconded the proposal made by Idris Francis that Congress become involved with the Daily Mail. Assuming Congress adopted the resolution before it, he proposed that a press release be sent to the Daily Mail and possibly to other newspapers.

Returning to the amendment proposed by the Anti-Common Market League, he pointed out that if the issue were put to the British Parliament before a referendum Parliament could ratify the Constitution and there would then be no scope for a referendum. Likewise, if it were put before Parliament and Parliament did not ratify the Constitution then again there would be no scope for a referendum; a referendum should come before final Parliamentary consideration of the whole issue.

He defended his proposed amendment, though he was prepared to take out the words "failing this". He argued that campaigners should concentrate on parliamentarians; the proposed Constitution would go to Parliament first and he had faith in the powers of the House of Lords to delay the passage of the bill and to insert a requirement for a referendum. He saw activity in Parliament as part of the build-up to the campaign which would hold the referendum at the appropriate stage.

Sir Michael Spicer pointed out that there were two issues: the referendum and the ratification. Donald Martin’s proposal would be to ask Parliament to reject the ratification subject to a referendum. But, as Eric Deakins had said, if Parliament ratified and passed it, which, with the current Labour majority in the Commons, was a distinct possibility, the referendum issue would have died, the Treaty would have been ratified and become the law of the land.

He said that it must be right first to campaign to get Parliament to reject the Treaty, which would go to Parliament first. Only Parliament could authorise a referendum. If the House of Commons agreed to ratification the measure would then come to the House of Lords which would have to refuse to ratify without holding a referendum. If Parliament could be persuaded to reject it in the first place a referendum would not be necessary.

He strongly supported those who had emphasised the need to give primacy to the democracy argument, particularly in the media. Democracy was the one thing which united all those in the Congress for Democracy and it was the Achilles heel of this particular draft constitution. Article 4 stated that the Union would have a legal personality; it would not have a democratic personality because that would mean the rule of the people. The Congress was on the side of democracy and its opponents were on the side of unelected, unaccountable, unrepresentative lawyers and judges dictating what would happen - and that had to be made clear to people.

He made the point that adoption of the EU Constitution meant adoption of the Euro. There would no longer be the option of Yes to Europe but No to the Euro. He thanked Martin Howe for his superb paper and suggested, given the high quality of research conducted by Congress, that the alternative to the European Union (the EEA, EFTA or even NAFTA) should be the next subject for research. It had been said earlier that the public was frightened that Britain would be out in the cold if she left the EU as a consequence of rejecting the Constitution. Ordinary voters had to be reassured that there was life beyond the EU. He also made the point that Europe was a magnificent continent which had led the development of every cultural possibility. It was important not to use the word "Europe" when meaning the European Union and to get it into people’s minds that being a member of the European Union was not the same as being a member of Europe - there were alternatives.

He also wanted to reassure people that, while in Malta earlier in the year helping with the campaign for a No vote on their accession, he had been surrounded by young people who were helping because of the anti-democratic implications of the EU. The young were supportive; they just needed to be motivated. He hoped to see more young people at the next Congress.

He stressed the need to refer to the European Union and not to Europe because referring to Europe played into the hands of the enemy.

Bringing the debate to a conclusion, Sir Michael Spicer asked for the approval of Congress for the proposal that the paper produced by Martin Howe and his team be expanded and published as soon as possible. This was agreed by Congress, with the proviso that it should not be turned into too long a document.

Sir Michael then turned to the Resolution as it related to the Ninth Congress:

Two amendments had been proposed. The first, proposed by Sir Archie Hamilton:

"If Parliament fails to provide a referendum then a privately-funded referendum of the whole British electorate should be held, possibly by a postal vote."

Sir Michael Spicer invited comments against that amendment.

Lionel Bell suggested that the wording of the amendment be changed to "Congress should have regard to the possibility of a private referendum" rather than try to commit the Congress to an action which was not within its power. This suggestion was supported by Roger Pincham.

Jacques Arnold pointed out that if Parliament ratified the constitution there was no point in having a referendum afterwards.

Iain McGregor opposed a private referendum because it defeated the whole attitude and atmosphere of democracy; it would not be a national referendum but an expression of opinion. He proposed a further amendment, to add at the end. "This referendum result to be decided by a clear two-thirds majority of those eligible to vote, as against actual voters. Any other margin either way should be taken as preference for the status quo ante."

The amendment proposed by Sir Archie Hamilton was approved by Congress.

The second amendment, proposed by Donald Martin:

in the last line, after "for" insert "the United Kingdom Parliament to reject the Constitutional Treaty and failing this to call for"

was then considered.

Martin Howe spoke against the second amendment. He thought it inconceivable that the House of Lords would block a Bill in its entirety, though it was credible that the House of Lords would attach a referendum amendment. He felt the amendment would dilute the thrust of the resolution. This was the Congress for Democracy and the resolution was calling for a referendum, a democratic principle.

Sir Michael invited contributions in favour of Donald Martin’s amendment.

One comment was made that Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights precluded anybody having authority to give away sovereignty to a foreign power; it ought to be the duty of Parliament to reject the treaty on that basis.

In support of the amendment, Peter Dul commented that initially the Government and Parliament, particularly the Conservatives, should be persuaded to refuse to sign up to the Convention. He suggested sending an open letter to all MPs pointing out that they derived their power directly from the people, on whose behalf they exercised it for the duration of a single Parliament, and requiring each MP to confirm that he would not vote for such a constitution.

Following a vote Congress rejected the amendment proposed by Donald Martin.

Congress moved on to consider and agree a third amendment: that for presentation purposes the Resolution be simplified by omitting reference to the Declaration for Democracy, which was passed at the Fifth Congress.

Sir Michael Spicer suggested that Congress should try to meet again in the autumn, assuming the money could be found. He said that the Agenda Committee had been considering a proposition that the next conference should be a multi-national one with speakers from organisations in other European countries.

She said that she had had an opportunity to speak on Talk Sport on the proposed Constitution. She had found the Working Party’s paper a very useful aide-memoir, had kept her talk very simple and had repeatedly used the word democracy. She had found it interesting to note that there had been many callers, who had all talked about the Euro; people had not absorbed anything about the Constitution. There was much to do to make people aware of the substance of the Constitution.

He made the point that there would be much to discuss at the next Congress. When the draft Constitution emerged on 20th June it would have the implicit stamp of approval from the governments of all the member state. It would then go to an inter-governmental conference in the autumn, and he suspected that the aim would be to have it agreed by the end of the year so that it could go to the Parliaments for ratification.

Closing the meeting, Sir Michael Spicer thanked everyone for attending.